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Abstract 
We introduce in this paper cryptographic protocols which use combinatorial group 
theory. Based on a combinatorial distribution of shares we present secret sharing 
schemes and cryptosystems using Nielsen transformations. Nielsen transformations 
are a linear technique to study free groups and general infinite groups. In addition 
the group of all automorphisms of a free group F, denoted by ( )Aut F , is generated 
by a regular Nielsen transformation between two basis of F, and each regular Nielsen 
transformation between two bases of F defines an automorphism of F. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is located in the area of group based cryptography. A cryptographic protocol 
consists of the collection of rules, formulas and methods to handle a cryptographic task. 
In cryptology it is common to call the parties who want to communicate privately with 
each other Alice and Bob. 
The traditional cryptographic protocols, both symmetric key and public key, such as 
the RSA algorithm, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curve methods, are number theory 
based. Hence, from a theoretical point of view, they depend on the structure of abelian 
groups. Although there have been no successful attacks on the standard protocols, there 
is a feeling that the strength of computing machinery has made the techniques less 
secure. As a result of this, there has been an active line of research to develop and 
analyse new cryptographic protocols, as for example cryptosystems and key exchange 
How to cite this paper: Fine, B., Molden-
hauer, A.I.S. and Rosenberger, G. (2016) Cryp- 
tographic Protocols Based on Nielsen Trans- 
formations. Journal of Computer and Com- 
munications, 4, 63-107. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/jcc.2016.412004  
 
Received: August 14, 2016 
Accepted: October 28, 2016 
Published: October 31, 2016 
 
Copyright © 2016 by authors and  
Scientific Research Publishing Inc. 
This work is licensed under the Creative 
Commons Attribution International  
License (CC BY 4.0). 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
   Open Access
B. Fine et al. 
 
64 
protocols, based on non-commutative cryptographic platforms. Up to this point the 
main sources for non-commutative platforms have been nonabelian groups. For an 
overwiev about mathematical cryptography see [1] and especially for a book about 
non-commutative group based cryptography see [2]. 
Important along the line of cryptographic protocols are secret sharing protocols. 
These consist of methods to distribute a secret among a group of users by giving a share 
of the secret to each. The secret can be recovered only if a sufficient number of users 
(but perhaps not all) combine their pieces. There are many different motivations for the 
secret sharing problem. One of the most important is the problem of maintaining 
sensitive information. There are two crucial issues here: availability and secrecy. If only 
one person keeps the entire secret, then there is a risk that the person might lose the 
secret or the person might not be available when the secret is needed. Hence it is often 
useful to utilize several people in order to access a secret. On the other hand, the more 
people who can access the secret, the higher the chance the secret will be leaked. By 
sharing a secret in a threshold scheme the availability and reliability issues can be 
addressed. The paper by C. Chum, B. Fine and X. Zhang [3] contains a wealth of 
information on secret sharing schemes in general and managing an access control 
group.  
This paper is organized as follows. We first describe secret sharing protocols and a 
combinatorial distributions of shares, which are given by D. Panagopoulos in [4]. After 
introductory definitions we start with a secret sharing scheme using directly the 
combinatorial distribution of shares. Based on this we present two schemes in which we 
apply regular Nielsen transformations in connections with faithful representations of 
free groups and the Nielsen reduction theory. We also modify the secret sharing 
schemes to a private key cryptosystem and finally Nielsen transformations are used for 
a public key cryptosystem which is inspired by the ElGamal cryptosystem. The new 
cryptographic protocols are in the dissertation of A. Moldenhauer [5] under her 
supervisor G. Rosenb-erger at the University of Hamburg. Thus, parts of this paper are 
from [5].  
2. Preliminaries for the Newly Developed Cryptographic 
Protocols   
A ( ),n t -secret sharing protocol, with ,n t∈  and t n≤ , is a method to distribute a 
secret among a group of n participants in such a way that it can be recovered only if at 
least t of them combine their shares. Hence any group of 1t −  or fewer participants 
cannot calculate the secret. The number t is called threshold. The person who distrib- 
utes the shares is called dealer. 
One of the first ( ),n t -secret sharing schemes is introduced by A. Shamir in [6]. It 
has become the standard method for solving the ( ),n t -secret sharing problem. 
A. Shamir uses polynomial interpolation for his ( ),n t -secret sharing scheme. Let   
be any field and let ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2, , , , , ,t tx y x y x y  be t points in 2  with pairwise 
distinct ix , 1 i t≤ ≤ . We say a polynomial ( )g x  over   interpolates these points if 
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( )i ig x y= , 1 i t≤ ≤ . A. Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is based on the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 1. [7] 
Let   be any field and let 1 2, , , tx x x  be t pairwise distinct elements of   and let 
1 2, , , ty y y  be any elements of  . Then there exists a unique polynomial of degree 
less than or equal to 1t −  that interpolates the t points ( ),i ix y , 1 i t≤ ≤ .  
A. Shamir’s ( ),n t -secret sharing scheme is roughly this: The dealer chooses a field 
 . The secret S is an element in  . The dealer picks a polynomial ( )g x  of degree 
1t −  with the secret S as constant term, that is, ( ) 2 11 2 1 ttg x S a x a x a x −−= + + + + , 
ia ∈  and 1 0ta − ≠ . He chooses pairwise distinct elements 1 2, , , nx x x ∈  , with 
0ix ≠  for all 1 i n≤ ≤  and distributes to each of the n participants a point 
( )( ),i ix g x  as a share. By Theorem 1 any t participants can determine the polynomial 
( )g x  (for example with Lagrange interpolation, see [7]) and hence recover the secret 
S. If less than t people combine their shares any element in   can be the constant 
term and hence the secret. A. Shamir suggested to use p p= =     where p is a 
large prime number. 
D. Panagopoulos presents in his paper [4] a ( ),n t -secret sharing scheme using 
group presentations with solvable word problem. For the secret sharing schemes in the 
following sections we use a combinatorial distribution of the shares, which is explained 
in the paper of D. Panagopoulos. 
Share distribution method explained by D. Panagopoulos. 
To distribute the shares in a ( ),n t -secret sharing scheme the dealer does the follo- 
wing steps: 
1) Calculate 
1
n
m
t
 
=  − 
, the number of all elements, for example { }1 2, , , ma a a , 
the participants need to know for the reconstruction of the secret.  
2) Let 1 2, , , mA A A  be an enumeration of the subsets of { }1,2, ,n  with 1t −  
elements. Define n subsets 1 2, , , nR R R  of the set { }1 2, , , ma a a  with the property.  
for 1, 2, , and 1,2, , .j i ja R i A j m i n∈ ⇔ ∈ = =/                 (1) 
3) The dealer distributes to each of the n participants one of the sets 1 2, , , nR R R .  
In addition to this share distribution method the new protocols in this paper are 
based on combinatorial group theory and Nielsen transformations. Therefore, we 
review some basic definitions concerning regular Nielsen transformations and Nielsen 
reduced sets (see [8] or [9]). 
Combinatorial group theory is the branch of algebra which studies groups with the 
help of group presentations. A group presentation for a group G consists of a set X of 
generators and a set R of defining relators on X. We write.  
| .G X R=  
The group G is called finitely generated if both sets X and R are finite. The newly 
developed cryptographic protocols use finitely generated free groups. Let F be a finitely 
generated free group with free generating set { }1 2  , , , qX x x x=  , q∈ , then the 
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group F is the set of all reduced words in 1X ± , which is defined as 
{ }1 1 1 11 1 2 2, , , , , ,q qX x x x x x x± − − −=  , where a word is called reduced if it does not contain 
subwords of the form 1j jx x
−  or 1j jx x
− , 1 j q≤ ≤ . The identity is considered as the 
empty word, which is 1. The set of relators for a free group consists only of trivial 
relators, which are of the form 1j jw w
−  or 1j jw w
− , with jw  a word in X, thus we 
denote F by  
.F X=  
The empty space on the right symbolized, that there are only trivial relators. For 
more information about group theory see for instance [8], [9] or [10]. 
Let F be a finitely generated free group on the free generating set { }1 2, , , qX x x x=  , 
2q ≥ , and let { }1 2 , , ,   tU u u u F= ⊂ , 2t ≥ , with iu  reduced words in X. 
Definition 2 An elementary Nielsen transformation on { }1 2, , , tU u u u F= ⊂  is 
one of the following transformations.   
(T1) replace some iu  by 
1
iu
− ;  
(T2) replace some iu  by i ju u  where j i≠ ;  
(T3) delete some iu  where 1iu = .  
In all three cases the ku  for k i≠  are not changed. A (finite) product of elemen- 
tary Nielsen transformations is called a Nielsen transformation. A Nielsen transfor- 
mation is called regular if it is a finite product of the transformations (T1) and (T2), 
otherwise it is called singular. The set U is called Nielsen-equivalent to the set V, if 
there is a regular Nielsen transformation from U to V.  
Nielsen transformations are a linear technique to study free groups and general 
infinite groups. In addition the group of all automorphisms of a free group F, denoted 
by ( )Aut F , is generated by a regular Nielsen transformation between two basis of F, 
and each regular Nielsen transformation between two basis of F defines an automo- 
rphism of F, see ([8], Korollar 2.10). 
Definition 3. A finite set U in F is called Nielsen reduced, if for any three elements 
1 2 3, ,v v v  from { }1 1 1 11 1 2 2, , , , , ,t tU u u u u u u± − − −=   the following conditions hold:   
(N0) 1 1v ≠ ;  
(N1) 1 2 1v v ≠  implies 1 2 1 2,v v v v≥ ;  
(N2) 1 2 1v v ≠  and 2 3 1v v ≠  implies 1 2 3 1 2 3v v v v v v> − + .  
Here v  denotes the free length of v F∈ .  
Proposition 4. ([8], Theorem 2.3) or ([9], Proposition 2.2)   
If { }1 2, , , nU u u u=   is finite, then U can be carried by a Nielsen transformation 
into some V such that V is Nielsen reduced.  
For the secret sharing schemes based on Nielsen transformations we will only use 
regular Nielsen transformations. We agree on some notations. 
We write ( )1 iT  if we replace iu  by 
1
iu
−  and we write ( ) .2 i jT  if we replace iu  
by i ju u . If we want to apply t-times one after the other the same Nielsen transfo- 
rmation ( )2T  we write ( ) .2
t
i jT    and hence replace iu  by 
t
i ju u . In all cases the 
ku  for i k≠  are not changed. 
Corollary 5. ([8], Korollar 2.9) 
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Let F be a free group with basis X and let U be a subset of X which is Nielsen reduced. 
Then it is  
1 1 1.X U X U± ± ±∩ = ∩                         (2) 
Especially, if U is also a basis for F, then 1 1X U± ±= .  
Theorem 6. ([8], Satz 2.6)   
Let U be Nielsen reduced, then U  is free on U.  
For the next lemma we need some notations. Let 1w ≠  be a freely reduced word in 
X. The initial segment s of w which is “a little more than half” of w (that is, 
1 1 1
2 2
w s w< ≤ + ) is called the major initial segment of w. The minor initial 
segment of w is that initial segment s′  which is “a little less than half” of w (that is, 
1 11
2 2
w s w′− ≤ < ). Similarly, major and minor terminal segments are defined. 
If the free length of the word w is even, we call the initial segment s of w, with 
1
2
s w=  the left half of w. Analogously, we call the terminal segment s′  of w with 
1
2
s w′ =  the right half of w. 
Let { }1 2, , , mw w w  be a set of freely reduced words in X, which are not the identity. 
An initial segment of a w-symbol (that is, of either iw  or 
1
iw
− , which are different 
w-symbols) is called isolated if it does not occur as an initial segment of any other 
w-symbol. Similarly, a terminal segment is isolated if it is a terminal segment of a 
unique w-symbol. 
Lemma 7. ([10], Lemma 3.1)   
Let { }1 2, , , mM w w w=   be a set of freely reduced words in X with 1jw ≠ , 
1 j m≤ ≤ . Then M is Nielsen reduced if and only if the following conditions are 
satisfied:  
1) Both the major initial and major terminal segments of each iw M∈  are isolated.  
2) For each iw M∈  of even free length, either its left half or its right half is isolated.  
There are different problems known in combinatorial group Theory, for example: 
Theorem 8. ([8], Satz 1.9) Isomorphism problem in free groups: 
Let X and Y be two sets. Let G X=  and H Y=  be two free groups on X 
and Y, respectively. The free group G is isomorphic to the free group H if and only if 
X Y= .  
Problem 9. Word problem:   
Let G X R=  be a presentation of a group and g G∈  a given word in X. 
Determine algorithmically (in finitely many steps) if g represents the identity or not.  
A further problem, which is a more general problem than the word problem and is 
needed for some of the developed cryptographic protocols based on combinatorial 
group theory, is the membership problem or also called extended word problem. 
Problem 10. Membership problem: 
Given a recursively presented group G, a subgroup H of G generated by 1 2, , , kh h h  
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and an element g G∈ , determine whether or not g H∈ .  
A related problem (to the membership problem) is the constructive membership 
problem. 
Problem 11. Constructive membership problem: 
Given a recursively presented group G, a subgroup H of G generated by 1 2, , , kh h h  
and an element h H∈ , find an expression of h in terms of 1 2, , , kh h h .  
Theorem 12. ([8], Satz 1.9) Isomorphism problem in free groups: 
Let X and Y be two sets. Let G X=  and H Y=  be two free groups on X 
and Y, respectively. The free group G is isomorphic to the free group H if and only if 
X Y= .  
Furthermore, we introduce a linear congruence generator because it is also used for 
the cryptosystems in this paper. 
For n∈  let :n n=    be the ring of integers modulo n. The corresponding 
residue class in n  for an integer β  is denoted by β  (see also [1]). 
Definition 13. [1] 
Let n∈  and , nβ γ ∈ . A bijective mapping : n nh →   given by 
x xβ γ+  is called a linear congruence generator.  
Theorem 14. [1] (Maximal period length for n = 2m, m∈ ) 
Let n∈ , with 2mn = , 1m ≥  and let ,β γ ∈  such that :   n nh →  , with 
x xβ γ+ , is a linear congruence generator. Further let { }0,1, , 1nα ∈ −  be given 
and 1x α= , ( )2 1x xh= , ( )3 2x xh= ,   . 
Then the sequence 1 2 3x , x , x ,  is periodic with maximal periodic length 2
mn =  if 
and only if the following holds:   
1) β  is odd, consequently 0β ≠ .  
2) If 2m ≥  then ( )1 mod 4β ≡ .  
3) γ  is odd, consequently 0γ ≠ .  
3. A Combinatorial Secret Sharing Scheme   
Now we present a ( ),n t -secret sharing scheme, whereby the secret is the sum of the 
multiplicative inverse of elements in the natural numbers. For the distribution of the 
shares the dealer uses the method by D. Panagopoulos described in Section 2. 
The numbers n and t are given, whereby n is the number of participants and t is the 
threshold. 
1) The dealer first calculates the number 
1
n
m
t
 
=  − 
.  
2) He chooses m elements 1 2, , , ma a a ∈  . From these elements he constructs 
analogously as in Section 0 the sets 1 2, , , nR R R . The secret S is the sum  
1
1: .
m
i i
S
a
+
=
= ∈∑                             (3) 
3) Each participant ip  gets one share iR , 1 i n≤ ≤ .  
If t of the n participants come together they can reconstruct the secret while they first 
combine their t private sets iR  and get by construction the set { }1 2 , , , mR a a a=  . 
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The secret is the sum of the inverse elements in the set R , that is  
1
1 .
m
i i
S
a=
= ∑                              (4) 
This cryptographic protocol is summarized in Table 1 . 
If the dealer needs a special secret S ∈   he gives every participant one more 
element x∈  in each iR , with  
: .Sx
S
=

                              (5) 
The participants get S  by multiplying the reconstructed secret S with x. 
Security 15. Each element ja  is exactly contained in ( )1n t− −  subsets. Hence for 
each 1,2, ,j m=   the element ja  is not contained in 1t −  subsets from 
{ }1 2, , , nR R R . As a consequence, ja  is in each union of t subsets. Otherwise, if just 
1t −  arbitrary sets from { }1 2, , , nR R R  are combined, there exist a j such that the 
element ja  is not included in the union of this sets. 
 
Table 1. Summary of the combinatorial ( ),n t -secret sharing scheme. 
( ),n t -secret sharing scheme 
Dealer  Participants 1 2, , , np p p   
Calculate 
1
n
m
t
 
=  − 
. 
Choose 1 2, , , ma a a ∈  . 
Construct sets { }1 2, , ,j mR a a a⊆   with share distribution 
method given by D. Panagopoulos; 
it is 
1
1j
n
R
t
− 
=  − 
 for 1, 2, ,j n=  .  
Distribute shares to the participants. 
 
 1 1R p→   
 2 2R p→   
    
 nR np→   
 
t  participants combine their shares and thus get 
the set { }1 2, , , ma a a . 
The secret is 
1
1 .
m
i i
S
a=
= ∑  
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If just one element ja  is absent, the participants do not get the correct sum S, and 
hence cannot compute the correct secret.  
Remark 16. We realize that the share distribution method by D. Panagopoulos is 
also given as a special case by M. Ito, A. Saito and T. Nishizeki in [11]. In [5] it is shown 
that if the method in [11] is used to generate a ( ),n t -secret sharing scheme then the 
same share distribution method as by D. Panagopoulos is described. M. Ito, A. Saito 
and T. Nishizeki use a multiple assignment scheme, which is a method to distribute to 
each participant more than only one share, together with a ( ),m m -secret sharing scheme. 
Thus, the share distribution method by D. Panagopoulos is a special case of paper [11]. 
In addition, in [5] it is shown in detail, that the purely combinatorial secret sharing 
scheme is very similar to a scheme, which J. Benaloh and J. Leichter obtain if they 
realize a ( ),n t -secret sharing scheme using minimal CNF-formula, described in their 
paper [12].  
Remark 17. It is important in terms of practicability, that the dealer calculates and 
distributes the shares for the participants long before the secret is needed by the 
participants. Hence, the dealer has enough time to execute the share distribution 
method and his computational cost should be of no consequence for the cryptographic 
protocol. If t participants reconstruct the secret, they add up only m elements, which is 
feasible in linear time.  
Example 18. We perform the steps for a ( )4,3 -secret sharing scheme. It is 4n =  
and 3t = . 
The dealer follows the steps: 
1) He first calculates 4 6
1 2
n
m
t
   
= = =   −   
.  
2) The dealer chooses the numbers 1 2 3 4: 2, : 1, : 2, : 8a a a a= = = = , 5 : 4a =  and 
6 : 2a = . The secret is  
1
1 23: .
8
m
i i
S
a=
= =∑  
(a) The six subsets with size 2 of the set { }1,2,3,4  are  
{ } { } { }1 2 31, 2 , 1,3 , 1,4 ,A A A= = =  
{ } { } { }4 5 62,3 , 2, 4 , 3, 4 .A A A= = =  
With help of the iA  the dealer gets the sets 1 2 3, ,R R R  and 4R , which contain 
elements from { }1 6, ,a a . He puts the element ja  for which i is not contained in the 
set jA  for 1, , 4i =   and 1, ,6j =  , into the set iR , thus it is:  
{ }4 5 6 1 4 5 61 , , , , ,A A A R a a a∈ ⇒ =/  
{ }2 3 6 2 2 3 62 , , , , ,A A A R a a a∈ ⇒ =/  
{ }1 3 5 3 1 3 53 , , , , ,A A A R a a a∈ ⇒ =/  
{ }1 2 4 4 1 2 44 , , , , .A A A R a a a∈ ⇒ =/  
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3) The dealer distributes the set iR  to the participant ip , for 1, , 4i =  .  
If three of the four participants come together, they can calculate the secret S. For 
example the participants 1 2,p p  and 3p  hold the set  
{ } { } { }
{ }
1 2 3
4 5 6 2 3 6 1 3 5
1 2 3 4 5 6
:
, , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
R R R R
a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a
= ∪ ∪
= ∪ ∪
=

 
and hence get the secret  
6
1
1 23 with .
8 ii i
S a R
a=
= = ∈∑   
4. A Secret Sharing Scheme Using a Regular Nielsen 
Transformation   
In this section we describe a ( ),n t -secret sharing scheme extends the ideas in Section 3 
by using Nielsen transformations. We consider free groups as abstract groups but also 
as subgroups of the special linear group of all 2 2×  matrices over  , that is,  
( )SL 2, | , , , and 1 .
a b
a b c d ad bc
c d
   = ∈ − =  
   
   
We use the special linear group over the rational numbers because these numbers 
can be stored and computed more efficiently on a computer than irrational numbers. 
Let F be a free group in ( )SL 2,  of rank :
1
n
m
t
 
=  − 
. The dealer wants to 
distribute the shares for the participants as described in Section 2. The shares will be 
subsets of a free generating set of the group F (in an abstract and an explicit version). 
The numbers n and t are given, whereby n is the number of participants and t is the 
threshold. The dealer does the following steps: 
1) He chooses an abstract free generating set X for the free group F of rank 
:
1
n
m
t
 
=  − 
, that is  
{ }1 2with : , , , .mF X X x x x= =                    (6) 
He also needs an explicit free generating set M, that is  
{ }1 2with : , , , mF M M M M M= =                   (7) 
and ( )SL 2,iM ∈  .  
2) With the known matrices in the set M he computes the secret  
( )
1
1: with : ,
m
j j
j j
S a tr M
a
+
=
= ∈ = ∈∑                    (8) 
( )jtr M  is the trace for the matrix ( ): SL 2,i
a b
M
c d
 
= ∈ 
 
 , that is, ( ) :itr M a d= + . 
If the dealer needs a special secret he can act as in Section 3 described.  
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3) The dealer constructs the shares for the participants in the following way:   
(a) He first applies a regular Nielsen transformation simultaneously for both sets X 
and M to get Nielsen-equivalent sets U and N to X and M, respectively (see Figure 1).  
The elements iu  are words in X and the elements iN  are words in M. Hence, it is 
( ) SL 2,iN ∈  . 
(b) The dealer now uses the method of D. Panagopoulos to split U and N and to get 
the shares ( ),i jR S  for the participants with iR U⊂  and jS N⊂ .  
4) The dealer distributes the shares.  
If t of the n participants combine their parts they obtain the sets U and N. The secret 
can be recovered as follows:   
1. The participants apply regular Nielsen transformations in a Nielsen reduction 
manner for U and step by step simultaneously for N. By Proposition 4 they get Nielsen 
reduced sets { }1 21 2, , , mmX x x x′ =     and { }1 21 2, , , mmM M M M δδ δ′ =   with 
{ }, 1, 1i iδ ∈ + − , see Figure 2. 
Because of Corollary 5 it is 1 1X X± ±′=  and 1 1M M± ±′= , respectively. Hence, 
( )1 2, , , mx x x′ ′ ′  differs to ( )1 2, , , mx x x  just in the position order and inverses. That 
means the set X ′  is the set X up to inverses. The same is true for M ′  and M . Thus, 
it is { }1 21 2, , , mmX x x x′ =     and also { }1 21 2, , , mmM M M M δδ δ′ =   with { }, 1, 1i iδ ∈ − .  
The cryptographic protocol is summarized in Table 2 (page 73). 
Less than t participants can neither get the whole set U, which is Nielsen-equivalent to 
X, nor the set N, which is Nielsen-equivalent to M. 
For the calculation of the secret, the participants need the set M, because the secret 
depends on the traces of the matrices iM M∈ . The participants need both sets U and N. 
If they just have one set U or N they cannot get information about the set M. 
If the set U is known, it is only known which Nielsen transformation should be done to 
get the Nielsen-equivalent set X, but it is unknown on which matrices they should be 
done simultaneously. 
If only the set N is known, then the matrices in ( )SL 2,  are known, but nobody 
knows which Nielsen transformation should be done on N to get the set M. It is also 
unknown how many Nielsen transformations were used. 
In the book ([13], page 247) of J. Lehner a method is given to explicitly obtain a free 
 
 
Figure 1. Simultaneously regular Nielsen transformations for the dealer. 
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Figure 2. Simultaneously regular Nielsen transformations for the participants. 
 
Table 2. Summary of the secret sharing scheme using Nielsen transformations and ( )SL 2, . 
( ),n t -secret sharing scheme 
Dealer Participants 1 2, , , np p p  
Calculate 
1
n
m
t
 
=  − 
. 
Choose abstract free generating set { }1 2 :  , , , mX x x x=   
and explicit free generating set { }1 2: , , , mM M M M=   
with ( )SL 2,iM ∈   (all or almost all ( )SL 2,iM ∉  ). 
Apply simultaneously regular Nielsen transformation 
(NT) on X and M: 
( )
( )
1 2
1 2
, , ,
NT
, , ,
m
m
x x x
u u u
↓


 
( )
( )
1 2
1 2
, , ,
NT
, , ,
m
m
M M M
N N N
↓


 
{ }1 2: , , , mU u u u=  ; { }1 2: , , , mN N N N=  . 
Construct sets jR U⊆  and jS N⊆  with share dis-
tribution method given by D. Panagopoulos; 
it is 
1
1j j
n
R S
t
− 
= =  − 
 for 1,2, ,j n=  . 
Distribute shares to the participants. 
 
( )1 1,
1
R S p→  
( )2 2,
2
R S p→  
  
( ),n nR S
np→  
 
t  participants combine their shares and thus get 
the sets U and N. 
Apply simultaneously regular Nielsen transforma-
tion (NT) on U and N: 
( )
( )
1 2
1 2
, , ,
NT
, , ,
m
m
u u u
x x x
↓
′ ′ ′


 
( )
( )
1 2
1 2
, , ,
NT
, , ,
m
m
N N N
M M M
↓
′ ′ ′


 
The secret is 
( )
1
1: with : .
m
j j
j j
S a tr M
a
+
=
′ ′= ∈ = ∈
′∑    
 
generating set M for a free group F on the abstract generating set { }1 2 : , , , mX x x x=  : 
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Theorem 19. [13] Let F be a free group with countably many free generators 
1 2, ,x x  . Corresponding to jx  define the matrix  
21
1
j j
j
j
r r
M
r
 − − +
=   − 
                         (9) 
with jr ∈  such that the following inequalities hold:  
1 13 and 2.j jr r r+ − ≥ ≥                       (10) 
The group G generated by { }1 2, ,M M   is isomorphic to F.  
We now present an example for this secret sharing scheme. 
Example 20. We perform the steps for a ( )3,2 -secret sharing scheme with the help 
of the computer program Maple 16. It is 3n = , 2t =  and hence 3 3
1
m  = = 
 
. 
First the Dealer generates the shares for the participants.   
1) The dealer chooses an abstract presentation for the free group F of rank 3  
{ }1 2 3with : , , .F X X x x x= =  
He takes an explicit presentation  
{ }1 2 3with : , , ,F M M M M M= =  
( )SL 2,iM ∈   as above. We first mention that the inequalities (10) hold for  
1 2 3
7 15, , 11
2 2
r r r= = =  
and hence the set of the matrices  
2
1
7 457 71
2 42 2 ,
77 11 22
M
     −− − +    
  = =  
   − −    
 
2
2
15 22115 151
2 42 2 ,
1515 11 22
M
     −− − +    
  = =  
   − −    
 
2
3
11 12011 1 11
1 111 11
M
− − − +  
= =   −−   
 
is a free generating set for a free group of rank 3.  
2) The dealer chooses  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 3 3: 7, : 15, : 22,a tr M a tr M a tr M= = − = = − = = −  
and hence the secret is  
3
1
1 589: .
2310j j
S
a=
= =∑  
3) Construction of the shares for the participants:  
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(a) First the dealer applies regular Nielsen transformations (NTs) simultaneously for 
both sets X and M to get Nielsen-equivalent sets U and N to X and M, respectively. 
These transformations are shown in Table 3 (see page 75) and Table 4 (see page 76). 
The Dealer obtains the sets  
{ } { }1 1 3 1 3 3 1 1 31 2 3 2 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 2, , : , ,U u u u x x x x x x x x x x x x x− − − − − − − −= =  
and  
{ }1 2 3, ,
3452369 25661603 80371 597401 1132425929 8417369243
4 4 4 4 4 4: , , .
237917 1768447 5145 38243 152350279 1132425989
2 2 2 2 4 4
N N N N=
      − −       =       
      − −            
 
(b) He gets the shares ( ),i jR S  for the participants with iR U⊂  and jS N⊂  as 
follows:   
 
Table 3. Nielsen transformations (NTs) of the dealer I. 
NTs theoretical set X explicit set M 
 { }1 2 3, ,x x x  
7 45 15 221
11 1202 4 2 4, ,
7 15 1 111 1
2 2
    − −     −       −      − −        
 
( )21T  { }11 2 3, ,x x x−  
7 45 15 221
11 1202 4 2 4, ,
7 15 1 111 1
2 2
    − − −     −       −      − − −        
 
( )1.22T  { }1 11 2 2 3, ,x x x x− −  
15 221
15 109 11 1202 4, ,
4 29 15 1 111
2
  − −   −         − − −     − −    
 
( )
3
3.2
2T    { }
1 1 3
1 2 2 3 2, ,x x x x x
− − −  
15 221
15 109 8565 636642 4, ,
4 29 15 799 59391
2
  − −   − −         − −      − −    
, 
( )2.32T  { }1 1 3 31 2 2 3 2 3 2, ,x x x x x x x− − − −  
80371 597401
15 109 8565 636644 4, ,
4 29 5145 38243 799 5939
2 2
  
   − −         − −          
 
( )11T  { }1 1 3 32 1 2 3 2 3 2, ,x x x x x x x− − − −  
80371 597401
29 109 8565 636644 4, ,
4 15 5145 38243 799 5939
2 2
  
  − − − −         
         
, 
( )1.22T  { }1 1 3 1 3 32 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 2, ,x x x x x x x x x x− − − − − −  
3452369 25661603 80371 597401
8565 636644 4 4 4, ,
237917 1768447 5145 38243 799 5939
2 2 2 2
    − −     − −       
              
, 
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Table 4. Nielsen transformations (NTs) of the dealer II. 
NTs theoretical set X explicit set M 
( )31T  { }1 1 3 1 3 3 12 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3, ,x x x x x x x x x x− − − − − −  
3452369 25661603 80371 597401
5939 636644 4 4 4, ,
237917 1768447 5145 38243 799 8565
2 2 2 2
    − −            − −              
, 
( )3.22T  { }1 1 3 1 3 3 1 1 32 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 2, ,x x x x x x x x x x x x x− − − − − − − −  
3452369 25661603 80371 597401 1132425929 8417369243
4 4 4 4 4 4, ,
237917 1768447 5145 38243 152350279 1132425989
2 2 2 2 4 4
      − −             
      − −            
 
  
i) It is 3 3
1 1
n
m
t
   
= = =   −   
.  
ii) The dealer chooses the elements 1 2 3, ,a a a    and gets the three sets  
{ } { } { }1 2 34 1 , 2 , 3 .A A A= = =  
With the help of the iA  the dealer gets the sets 1 2,R R′ ′  and 3R′  which contain 
elements from the set { }1 2 3, ,a a a   . He puts the element ja  by which i is not contained 
in the set jA  for 1,2,3i =  and 1,2,3j = , into the set iR′ ..  
{ }2 3 1 2 31 , , ,A A R a a′∈ ⇒ =/    
{ }1 3 2 1 32 , , ,A A R a a′∈ ⇒ =/    
{ }1 2 3 1 23 , , .A A R a a′∈ ⇒ =/    
Now we apply this to U and N to create the share-sets for the participants, respec- 
tively:  
{ } { }1 2 3 1 2 3, , , ,R u u S N N= =  
{ } { }2 1 3 2 1 3, , , ,R u u S N N= =  
{ } { }3 1 2 2 1 2, , , ,R u u S N N= =  
4) The Dealer distributes to each participant a tuple ( ),i jR S . Participant 1p  gets 
( )1 2,R S , 2p  gets ( )2 3,R S  and 3p  gets ( )3 1,R S .  
Assume the participants 1p  and 2p  come together to reconstruct the secret. They 
are able to generate the sets { }1 2 3, ,U u u u=  and { }1 2 3, ,N N N N= . The secret can be 
recovered as follows. 
The participants apply regular Nielsen transformations step by step simultaneously 
for both sets  U and N to get X ′  and M ′ . The steps are shown in the Table 5 (see 
page 77) and Table 6 (see page 78). 
With the knowledge of the set 
7 45 15 221
11 1202 4 2 4, ,
7 15 1 111 1
2 2
M
    − −     −  ′ =      −      − −        
 the 
participants can reconstruct the secret easily. It is  
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Table 5. Nielsen transformations (NTs) from the participants I. 
NTs theoretical set U explicit set N 
 { }1 1 3 1 3 3 1 1 32 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 2, ,x x x x x x x x x x x x x− − − − − − − −  
3452369 25661603 80371 597401 1132425929 8417369243
4 4 4 4 4 4, ,
237917 1768447 5145 38243 152350279 1132425989
2 2 2 2 4 4
      − −             
      − −            
 
( )21T  { }1 1 3 3 1 3 1 1 32 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 2, ,x x x x x x x x x x x x x− − − − − − −  
3452369 25661603 38243 597401 1132425929 8417369243
4 4 2 4 4 4, ,
237917 1768447 5145 80371 152350279 1132425989
2 2 2 4 4 4
      − − −             
      − − −            
 
( )3.22T  { }1 1 3 3 1 3 12 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3, ,x x x x x x x x x x− − − − −  
3452369 25661603 38243 597401
5939 636644 4 2 4, ,
237917 1768447 5145 80371 799 8565
2 2 2 4
    − − −            − −      −        
 
( )21T  { }1 1 3 1 3 3 12 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3, ,x x x x x x x x x x− − − − − −  
3452369 25661603 80371 597401
5939 636644 4 4 4, ,
237917 1768447 5145 38243 799 8565
2 2 2 2
    − −            − −              
 
( )2.32T  { }1 1 3 1 3 12 1 2 3 2 2 2 3, ,x x x x x x x x− − − − −  
3452369 25661603 15 221
5939 636644 4 2 4, ,
237917 1768447 15 799 85651
2 2 2
    − − − −            − −      − −        
 
( )1.32T  { }1 1 1 3 12 1 2 2 2 3, ,x x x x x x− − − −  
653 9679 15 221
5939 636642 4 2 4, ,
667 15 799 856545 1
2 2
    − −            − −      − − − −        
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 3 3: 7, : 15, : 22a tr M a tr M a tr M= = − = = − = = −  
and hence it is  
3
1
1 1 1 1 589: .
7 15 22 2310j j
S
a=
= = + + =∑  
In general we can use any free matrix group F of rank :
1
n
m
t
 
=  − 
 for a ( ),n t - 
secret sharing scheme as it is described in this section. The shares can be generated by 
the above method and are tuples ( ),i jR S  with iR U⊂  and jS N⊂ . Some other 
ideas for the secret S are  
( ) ( )
11
: or : or
m m
i i
ii
S tr M S tr M
==
= = ∑∏                   (11) 
( )( ) ( )( )2 2
11
: or : or
m m
i i
ii
S tr M S tr M
==
= = ∑∏                 (12) 
( ) ( )
2
2
2 1 2
11
: , if is even or : .
m
m
i i i
ii
S tr M M m S tr M−
==
= = ∑∏            (13) 
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Table 6. Nielsen transformations (NTs) from the participants II. 
NTs theoretical set U explicit set N 
( )21T  { }1 1 3 12 1 2 2 2 3, ,x x x x x x− − −  
653 9679 15 221
5939 636642 4 2 4, ,
667 15 799 856545 1
2 2
    −            − −      − − −        
 
( )1.22T  { }1 3 12 1 2 2 3, ,x x x x x− −  
15 221
29 109 5939 636642 4, ,
4 15 15 799 85651
2
  −  − −         − −     −    
 
( )11T  { }1 3 11 2 2 2 3, ,x x x x x− −  
15 221
15 109 5939 636642 4, ,
4 29 15 799 85651
2
  −           − − − −     −    
 
( )1.22T  { }3 11 2 2 3, ,x x x x−  
7 45 15 221
5939 636642 4 2 4, ,
7 15 799 85651 1
2 2
    − −            − −      − −        
 
( )31T  { }31 2 3 2, ,x x x x−  
7 45 15 221
8565 636642 4 2 4, ,
7 15 799 59391 1
2 2
    − −     − −       
      − −        
 
( )
3
3.2
2T    { }1 2 3, ,x x x  
7 45 15 221
11 1202 4 2 4, ,
7 15 1 111 1
2 2
    − −     −       −      − −        
 
5. Another Secret Sharing Scheme Based on Nielsen 
Transformations   
We explain another secret sharing scheme which arises of the protocol in Section 4. As 
in the previous section, let F be a finitely generated free group with the abstract free 
generating set { }1 2: , , , qX x x x=  , { }\ 1q∈ , that is,  
.F X=  
For a ( ),n t -secret sharing scheme the dealer chooses a Nielsen reduced set 
{ }1 2, , ,  mU u u u F= ⊂ , with 1
n
m
t
 
=  − 
. The iu  are given as words in X. The secret 
is the sum  
1
1: ,
m
i i
S
u=
= ∑                            (14) 
with iu  the length of the word iu . 
The dealer does a regular Nielsen transformation on the set U to get the Nielsen- 
equivalent set V (see Figure 3). 
Each participant ip , 1 i n≤ ≤ , gets one set iR V⊂ , as in the previous secret 
sharing scheme above. 
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Figure 3. Regular Nielsen transformation. 
 
 If t of the n participants come together to reconstruct the secret, they combine their 
shares and get the set { }1 2, , , mV v v v=  . They have to find a Nielsen-reduced set 
{ }1 2: , , , mU u u u′ ′ ′ ′=   to V. They apply Nielsen transformations in a Nielsen reducing 
manner as described in [8] and [9], and get from V a Nielsen-reduced set U ′ . The 
secret is the sum  
1
1 , with
m
i
i i
S u U
u=
′ ′= ∈
′∑                         (15) 
because for each i it is i jX Xu u′ =  for some j (see the proof of Corollary 3.1 in [10]). 
From U ′  we get U  by permutations and length preserving Nielsen transformations. 
This ( ),n t -secret sharing scheme is summarized in Table 7 (page 80). 
6. A Symmetric Key Cryptosystem Using Nielsen Transformations  
In this section we introduce a symmetric key cryptosystem using Nielsen transfo- 
rmations. Before Alice and Bob are able to communicate with each other, they have to 
make some arrangements. 
We speak about public parameters also in private key cryptosystems, because these 
are parameters which each person, also an eavesdropper, Eve, gets, if she looks at the 
sent ciphertext. Public parameters are also elements, which Alice and Bob communicate 
with each other publicly. It is also not a secret which plaintext alphabet is used for the 
communication. 
Public Parameters. 
They first agree on the following public parameters. 
1) A finitely generated free group F with free generating set { }1 2, , , qX x x x=   with 
2q ≥ .  
2) A plaintext alphabet { }1 2, , , NA a a a=   with 2N ≥ .  
3) An abstract free group H U=  with ( )rank H A N= =  and an abstract free 
generating set { }1 2, , , NU u u u=  , with iu , 1 i N≤ ≤ , abstract letters. 
  4) A subset { } ( )1280 1 2 1: , , ,Aut f f f Aut H−= ⊂  of automorphisms of H. It is
:if H H→  and the if , 
1280,1, , 2 1i = − , pairwise different, are generated with the 
help of 0-1-sequence (of different length) and random numbers, see ([5], Section 4.4). 
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Table 7. Summary of the ( ),n t -secret sharing scheme using Nielsen transformations together 
with Nielsen reduced sets and free lengths of certain words. 
( ),n t -secret sharing scheme 
Dealer Participants 1 2, , , np p p  
Calculate 
1
n
m
t
 
=  − 
. 
Choose abstract free generating set 
{ }1 2, , , qX x x x=   with { }\ 1q∈  and a Nielsen 
reduced set { }1 2, , , mU u u u F= ⊂ , iu  words in X. 
Apply regular Nielsen transformation (NT) on U: 
( )
( )
1 2
1 2
, , ,
NT
, , ,
m
m
u u u
v v v
↓


 
{ }1 2: , , , mV v v v=  . 
Construct sets jR V⊆  with share distribution 
method given by D. Panagopoulos; 
it is 1
1j
n
R
t
− 
=  − 
 for 1, 2, ,j n=  . 
Distribute shares to the participants. 
 
1
1
R p→  
2
2
R p→  
  
nR
np→  
 
t participants combine their shares and 
thus get the set V. 
Apply regular Nielsen transformation 
(NT) on V: 
( )
( )
1 2
1 2
, , ,
NT
, , ,
m
m
v v v
u u u
↓
′ ′ ′


 
The secret is 
1
1 .
m
i i X
S
u=
=
′∑  
  
The set Aut  is part of the key space. 
5) They agree on a linear congruence generator 128 1282 2:h →   with a maximal 
period length.  
Private Parameters. 
Now, they agree on the private parameters. 
1) Alice and Bob choose an explicit Nielsen reduced set U with N elements, which 
are words in X. Such systems U are easily to construct (see Lemma 7 and Theorem 6 or 
also [8] and [9]). 
Now, it is UF U=  a free subgroup of F with rank N. It is Nred  the set of all 
minimal Nielsen reduced sets with N elements in F, which is part of the key space.  
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2) They use a one-to-one correspondence  
for 1, , .j j
A U
a u j N
→
= 
                     (16) 
3) Alice and Bob agree on an automorphism Autfα ∈ , hence α  is the common 
secret starting point { }1280,1, , 2 1α ∈ − , with 1281 2u α= ∈ , for the linear 
congruence generator. With this α  they are able to generate the sequence 
1 2u u u
, , ,
z
f f f  (with z the number of the plaintext units, which are letters from A) of 
automorphisms of the set Aut , which they need for encryption and decryption, 
respectively. 
Remark 21. If the explicit set { }1 2: , , , NU u u u=  , iu  word in X, is used, then UF  
is a free subgroup of F and with the automorphism u j Autf ∈  with u :j U Uf F F→ , 
the set ( ) ( ) ( ){ }u u 1 u 2 u, , ,j j jjf NU f u f u f u=   is generated, which is Nielsen equivalent 
to the set U.  
The key space: The set Nred  of all minimal (with respect to a lexicographical 
order) Nielsen reduced set of F with N elements. The set Aut  of 2128 randomly chosen 
automorphism of UF . 
Private Key Cryptosystem. 
Now, we explain the private key cryptosystem and look carefully at the steps for Alice 
and Bob. 
Public knowledge: F X= , { }1 2, , , qX x x x=   with 2q ≥ ; plaintext alphabet 
{ }1 2, , , NA a a a=   with 2N ≥ ; the set Aut ; a linear congruence generator h. 
Encryption and Decryption Procedure:   
1) Alice and Bob agree privately on the private parameters: a set NredU ∈  and an 
automorphism Autfα ∈ . They also know the one-to-one correspondence between U 
and A.  
2) Alice wants to transmit the message  
1 2 , 1,zS s s s z= ≥                         (17) 
with is A∈  to Bob. 
2.1) She generates with the linear congruence generator h and the knowledge of fα  
the z automorphisms 
1 2u u u
, , ,
z
f f f , which she needs for encryption. It is 1u α= , 
( )2 1u uh= ,  , ( )1u uz zh −= . 
2.2) The encryption is as follows.  
( )uif then : , 1 , 1 .ii t i i ts a s c f u i z t N= = ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤            (18) 
Recall that the one-to-one correspondence A U→  with j ja u , for 
1, 2, ,j N=  , holds. The ciphertext  
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2u 1 u 2 u
1 2
with ˆ
z z i t i t
z
C f s f s f s s u s a
c c c
= = ⇔ =
=


          (19) 
is sent to Bob. The jc  are called the ciphertext units and we do not perform cancell- 
ations between ic  and 1ic +  and the end of each ic  is marked, 1 1i z≤ ≤ − , for exa- 
mple with the symbol “  ”. On the one hand the ciphertext unit jc  can be seen as a 
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word in U, because the set ( ) ( ) ( ){ }u u 1 u 2 u, , ,j j jjf NU f u f u f u=   is Nielsen equivalent 
to U and ( ) ( )u u :ˆj jj k jf s f u c= = , for j ks a= , is an element in u jfU . On the other 
hand it can be written as a word in X, because the explicit elements in U are words in X 
and so are the elements in the Nielsen equivalent set 
u jf
U  to U. 
3) Bob gets the ciphertext  
1 2 ,zC c c c=                                 (20) 
with jc , 1 j z≤ ≤ , words in X. He knows where each ciphertext unit jc  begins and 
ends. Hence, he gets the information that he has to use z automorphisms of F from the 
set Aut  for decryption. He has two possibilities for decryption.  
3.1.a) With the knowledge of fα , the set { }1 2, , , NU u u u=  , the linear congruence 
generator h and the number z, he computes for each automorphism uif , 1, 2, ,i z=  , 
the set  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }u u 1 u 2 u, , , ,i i iif NU f u f u f u=                      (21) 
with ( )ui jf u  written as a reduced word in X. Hence, with the one-to-one 
correspondence between U and A, he gets a one-to-one correspondence between the 
letters in the alphabet A and the words of the ciphertext depending on the 
automorphisms uif . This is shown in Table 8 (page 82). 
With the knowledge of the Table 8 (page 82) the decryption is as follows  
( )uif then , 1 , 1 .ii t i i tc f u c s a i z t N= = ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤           (22) 
He generates the plaintext message  
1 2 ,zS s s s=                            (23) 
with is A∈ , from Alice. 
3.1.b) Bob knows the Nielsen reduced set U, hence with an algorithm as for example 
explained in the book ([8], page~33) he is able to write the elements ic  as words in U. 
With the knowledge of the automorphism fα , the set { }1 2, , , NU u u u=  , the linear 
congruence generator h and the number z, he gets the automorphisms uif  which 
Alice used for encryption of ic . Because of the fact that a one-to-one correspondence 
between A and U is used and the ciphertext unit ic  is an image of an element in U 
under the automorphism uif , Bob knows with the automorphism uif  and the 
ciphertext unit ic  written as word in U, the plaintext letter ja A∈  which corres- 
ponds to the ciphertext unit ic .  
This cryptographic protocol is summarized in Table 9 (page 83). 
 
Table 8. Plaintext alphabet { }1 2, , , NA a a a=   corresponding to ciphertext alphabet uifU  
depending on the automorphisms uif .  
 u1fU  u2fU    uzfU  
1a  ( )1u 1f u  ( )2u 1f u  

 ( )u 1zf u  
2a  ( )1u 2f u  ( )2u 2f u  

 ( )u 2zf u  
      

   
Na  ( )1u Nf u  ( )2u Nf u  

 ( )u z Nf u  
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Remark 22. As soon as Alice and Bob agree on the starting seed automorphism and 
the Nielsen reduced set U, Bob is able to calculate the first columns of Table 8 (page 82) 
for decryption (he does not know how many columns he will need because he does not 
know yet how long the plaintext from Alice will be). If he gets the ciphertext C from 
Alice, he only has to do a search in the table to get the corresponding plaintext units to 
 
Table 9. Summary of the private key cryptosystem. 
Public Knowledge 
F X= , { }1 2, , , qX x x x=  , 2q ≥ ; plaintext alphabet { }1 2, , , NA a a a=  , 2N ≥ ; 
abstract free group H U= , { }1 2, , , NU u u u=   with iu  abstract letters; 
set ( )Aut Aut H⊂ ; linear congruence generator h of maximal periodic length. 
Alice Bob 
Private keys 
Explicit set { }1 2, , , NU u u u=   with iu  words in X, U F⊂  Nielsen reduced set, 
U N= ; seed Autfα ∈ , one-to-one correspondence A U→ , j ja u . 
Encryption 
Choose message 
1 2 , 1,zS s s s z= ≥  
with is A∈ . 
Calculate 
( ) ( )1 2 1 1u , u u , , u uz zh hα −= = = , obtain 
1 2u u u
, , ,
z
f f f . 
Encryption procedure: 
if i ts a=  then ( )u: ii i ts c f u= , 1 i z≤ ≤  
1 .t N≤ ≤  
Ciphertext: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2u 1 u 2 u 1 2
= ,
z z z
C f s f s f s c c c=    
with ic  written as words in X. 
 
1 2 zC c c c=→    
Decryption 
 
Compute z automorphism: 
( ) ( )1 2 1 1u , u u , , u uz zh hα −= = = , obtain 
1 2u u u
, , ,
z
f f f . 
Two possibilities: 
1. For each uif , 1, 2, ,i z=   compute 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
u u 1 u 2 u
= , , ,
i i iif N
U f u f u f u  
and get a table like Table 8 (page 82). (Decryption: 
Search in this table.) 
if ( )uii tc f u=  then i i tc s a= , 1 i z≤ ≤  
1 .t N≤ ≤  
2. Use Nielsen reduced set U and an algorithm to 
write the ciphertext units ic  (given as words in X) 
as words in U. Together with the used 
automorphism, the ciphertext is decrypted correctly. 
Reconstruct plaintext message 
1 2 ,zS s s s=   with is A∈ . 
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the ciphertext units. If columns are missing to decrypt the ciphertext, he calculates the 
missing columns. Thus, in Version 3.1.a. instead of Version 3.1.b. for decryption Bob is 
able to do calculations for decryption even before he knows the ciphertext.  
Remark 23. The cryptosystem is a polyalphabetic system, that means, a word 
iu U∈ , and hence a letter ia A∈ , is encrypted differently at different positions in the 
plaintext, because different automorphisms are used during the encryption procedure 
for each ciphertext unit. Thus, for the ciphertext, a statistical frequency attack (see for 
instance [1]) over the frequency of words, which correspond to letters in the plaintext 
alphabet, or groups of words, is useless.  
It follows an example, in which for decryption a table (see Table 8 (page 82)) is used, 
which stores the ciphertext alphabet 
uif
U  and is generated with the automorphisms 
Alice uses for encryption, see Example 24. 
Additionally, in [5] an example is given, in which Bob knows the Nielsen reduced set 
U, hence with a known algorithm he is able to write the ciphertext as a sequence of 
words in U. With the automorphisms Alice uses for encryption he is able to decrypt the 
ciphertext correctly. 
Example 24. This example was executed in GAP1. All details are given in Appendix 
A. Firstly, Alice and Bob agree on public parameters.   
1) Let F be the free group on the free generating set { }, ,X x y z= .  
2) Let { } { }1 2 8, , , , , , , , , ,A a a a= =  L E I O U A V B  be the plaintext alphabet.  
3) Let H be the abstract free group of rank 8A =  with free generating set 
{ }1 2 8, , ,U u u u=  .  
4) A set ( )Aut Aut H⊂  is determined. In this example we give the automorphisms, 
which Alice and Bob use for encryption and decryption, respectively, just at the mom- 
ent when they are needed.  
5) The linear congruence generator with maximal periodic length is  
128 1282 2
:h →   
u 133u 51.+  
The private parameters for this example are the following:   
1) Let UF  be the explicit finitely generated free group, which is generated with the 
free generating set { }1 2 8, , ,U u u u=   with words in X, for this example it is  
1 1 1 1 2
1 2 3 4: , : , : , : ,u xyz u yzy u x zx u y x
− − − −= = = =  
1 1 1 3 3 2
5 6 7 8: , : , : , : .u z xyx u z yx u x y u y z
− − − −= = = =  
The starting automorphism 
1u
f  is 23442f , hence it is 1u 23442α= = . It is known, 
that i ia u , 1, 2, ,12i =  , for iu U∈  and ia A∈  , therefore.  
1 1 1 1 2
1 2 3 4, , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆu xyz u yzy u x zx u y x
− − − −= = = = = = = =L E I O  
1 1 1 3 3 2
5 6 7 8, , , .ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆu z xyx u z yx u x y u y z
− − − −= = = = = = = =U A V B  
 
 
1Groups, Algorithms and Programming [14]. 
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We now look at the encryption and decryption procedure for Alice and Bob.   
2) With the above agreements Alice is able to encrypt her message  
.S = LOVE  
Her message is of length 4. She generates the ciphertext as follows:  
2.1) First, she determines, with the help of the linear congruence generator 
128 1282 2
:h →   with u 133u 51+  and the starting seed 23442α = , the four 
automorphisms ui Autf ∈ , 1 4i≤ ≤ , which she needs for encryption. It is  
( )1 2 1u 23442,u u 3117837,hα= = = =  
( ) ( )3 2 4 3u u 414672372 and u u 55151425527.h h= = = =  
The automorphisms are describable with the help of regular Nielsen transformations, 
it is   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
2
u 1.7 2.4 5 7.8 3.4 4.6 5.1 7
6.3 8.1 7.4 7 1.2 2.3 4.5
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1ˆ
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 ,
f N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N
 =   , 
1u
:f H H→  
1
1 1 7 2 4 5 5 1 7, ,u u u u u u u u u
−
   
2 2
2 2 4 3 4 6 6 3 4, ,u u u u u u u u u   
2 1 1
3 3 4 7 6 4 7 8, ,u u u u u u u u
− −
   
1
4 4 6 5 1 7 8 8 1 7, .u u u u u u u u u u
−
   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
u 1.3 3.5 2 4 6.5 1 3.4 5.2 7.6
4.2 2.8 8.4 4 1.4 2.6 5.6 6.4 4.7
2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2ˆ
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 ,
f N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N N
 =    
2u
:f H H→  
1 1 1
1 3 1 2 4 5 5 2 6 5, ,u u u u u u u u u u
− − −
   
1
2 2 8 6 5 6 6 5 2 4, ,u u u u u u u u u u
−
   
2
3 3 5 4 7 7 6 5, ,u u u u u u u u
−
   
1 1
4 2 4 7 6 5 8 8 4 2, .u u u u u u u u u u
− −
   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3
2
u 2 5 8 6.3 3.7 1.2 4.8 5.6 8.3
6.3 8 2.3 7.4 1.8 3.4
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2ˆ
2 1 2 2 2 2 ,
f N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N
 =    
3u
:f H H→  
1 1 1 1
1 1 2 7 3 8 5 5 6 3, ,u u u u u u u u u u
− − − −
   
1 2
2 2 3 7 6 6 3 7, ,u u u u u u u u
−
   
2 2
3 3 7 4 8 7 7 4 8, ,u u u u u u u u u
− −
   
2 1 1
4 4 8 8 7 3 8, .u u u u u u u
− − −
   
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
4
3
u 1 3 4 6.2 8.2 2.3 3.4 5.2 7.4
1.3 4.5 8.3 1 2 7.2 3 2.3 3.5 6.1
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2ˆ
2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 ,
f N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N N N
 =   , 
4u
:f H H→  
1
1 4 3 1 5 5 2 3, ,u u u u u u u u
−
   
1
2 3 2 4 3 6 6 2 4 3 1, ,u u u u u u u u u u u
−
   
1 1 1
3 4 3 5 2 3 7 7 4 3 2, ,u u u u u u u u u u u
− − −
   
1 1 3 1 1
4 4 5 2 3 8 8 2 3 4, .u u u u u u u u u u
− − − −
   
the Nielsen transformations are applied from the left to the right.  
2.2) Secondly, she encrypts her message. The ciphertext is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
u u u u
u 1 u 4 u 7 u 2
2 1
1 7 2 4 2 4 7 6 5 7 4 8 3 2 4 3
C f f f f
f u f u f u f u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u− −
=
=
=   
L O V E
 
The ciphertext C is written as words in X, it is  
( )
2 1
1 7 2 4 2 4 7 6 5 7 4 8 3 2 4 3
23 2 2 2 2 5 1 1 1 5 2 3 1 1 1 2 1
C u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
xyzx y zy x yzy x yz yx z xyx x z y x zx yz y xzx
− −
− − − − − − − − − − −
=
=
  
  
 
3) Bob gets the ciphertext  
( )23 2 2 2 2 5 1 1 1 5 2 3 1 1 1 2 1C xyzx y zy x yzy x yz yx z xyx x z y x zx yz y xzx− − − − − − − − − − −=     
from Alice. Thus, he knows that he needs 4 automorphisms for decryption.  
3.1) Bob knows the set U, the linear congruence generator h and the starting seed 
automorphism 23442f . For decryption he uses tables like Table 8 (page 82). 
Now, he is able to compute for each automorphism uif  the set uifU , 1 4i≤ ≤ , 
and to generate Table 10 (page 86) and Table 11 (page 87). 
With these tables he is able to reconstruct the plaintext from Alice. He searches for 
the plaintext element is  the ciphertext unit ic  in the column uifU , 1 4i≤ ≤ , and 
hence gets the alphabet letter j ia s=  for a { }1, 2, ,8j∈  . Therefore, he decrypts the 
ciphertext to the message.  
 
Table 10. Correspondence: Plaintext alphabet to ciphertext alphabet I. 
 
u1f
U  
u2f
U  
L  3 2 2 2xyzx y zy x−  ( )21 1 1 2 2xz y x yzy x− − − −  
E  ( )22 1 1 2yzy xzx y x− − −  1 2 3 1 1yz y z yx z xyx− − − −  
I  ( )21 1 1 2x zx y x− − −  ( )21 1 1 1 1x zx z x yx x y− − − − −  
O  1 2 1 2 1 1 3y x z yx y x zxyzx y− − − − −  2 5 1 1 1yzy x yz yx z xyx− − − −  
U  1 1 1 3x y x zxyzx y− − −  ( )21 1 1 1 1 1z xy z y z yx z xyx− − − − − −  
A  ( )21 2 1 1 2z yx zx y x− − − −  ( )21 1 1 2 2z yx z xy zy x− − − −  
V  1 2 3 4 2xy zx yx y z− − −  3 1 1 1x yz yx z xyx− − −  
B  3 2 3y z xyzx y−  3 2 2 2 1 1y z x y z y− − − −  
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Table 11. Correspondence: Plaintext alphabet to ciphertext alphabet II. 
 
u3f
U  
u4f
U  
L  1 2 2 1 3 2xyzyz y x z xy z− − − − −  1y xzyz−  
E  1 1 1 2yz y x zx y− − −  1 1 1 2 1x zx yz y xzx− − − − −  
I  ( )21 4 2 3x zx z y− −  ( )21 1 1 1 1y xzx z xy zy xz x− − − − −  
O  ( )21 2 2 3y x z y− −  ( )22 1 1 1x yz xy zy xz x− − − −  
U  1 1 1 2 1x y x yx zx− − − − −  ( )21 1 1z xy zy xz x− − −  
A  ( )21 2 2z y x z x y− −  1 1 2z yx yzy xzyz− − −  
V  ( )25 2 3x z y−  3 2 1 1 1 1x yx yx zx yz y− − − − −  
B  1 2 1 3 2y x z xy z− − − −  3 2 3 1 1 1y z yz y xz x y− − − −  
 
( )23 2 2 2 2 5 1 1 1 5 2 3 1 1 1 2 1C xyzx y zy x yzy x yz yx z xyx x z y x zx yz y xzx− − − − − − − − − − −=     
.S = LOVE  
Security 25. The cryptosystem is a polyalphabetic system, that means, a word 
iu U∈ , and hence a letter ia A∈ , is encrypted differently at different positions in the 
plaintext, because different automorphisms are used during the encryption procedure 
for each ciphertext unit. Thus, for the ciphertext, a statistical frequency attack (see for 
instance [1]) over the frequency of words, which correspond to letters in the plaintext 
alphabet, or groups of words, is useless. 
The security depends on the fact, that the set U is private. Note, that the ciphertext 
units ic  are elements in UF , with UF U= . An eavesdropper, Eve, knows that the 
elements of the set U, which where used for the encryption, can be found in the ball 
( )1,B F L  of the Cayley graph from F, with  
{ }1 max | 1, 2, ,i XL c i z= =                       (24) 
and ic  ciphertext units of an intercepted ciphertext  
1 2 .zC c c c=                              (25) 
The symbol “  ” marks the end of each ciphertext unit ic , 1 1i z≤ ≤ − . 
Let  
{ }1 2, , , zC c c c=                            (26) 
be the set of ciphertext units and let NredC  be a Nielsen reduced set of C , hence the 
group 
NredC
F

, generated by NredC , is a free subgroup of UF  and ( )NredCrank F z≤ . The 
main security certification depends on the fact, that for a single subset V of UF  with K 
elements Eve finds a Nielsen reduced set in the running time ( )2 2Kλ , with λ  the 
maximum over the free length of the elements in the subset V with K primitive 
elements, but she has to test all possible subsets of K elements for which she needs 
exponential running time, because the number of primitive elements grows exponen- 
tially with the free length, here with 1L . She searches in a ball ( )1,B F L , with 
{ }1 max |i iL c c C= ∈   for these primitive elements. 
A subset of V is also known, it is NredC V⊂  but she has to put all other primitive 
elements to this set and proves if V ′ , which is Nielsen reduced to V, is of order N and 
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hence a candidate for U. 
Furthermore, the security depends on the way how Alice and Bob choose the 
automorphisms of the set Aut . To verify, whether a candidate set V ′  is very likely 
the set U used by Alice and Bob, it is likely that Eve writes the ciphertext units ic  with 
letters of her candidate set 1V ±′ . This is possible because the constructive membership 
problem (see Problem 11) is solvable in abstract free groups and Nielsen reduced sets. 
Thus, she could get hints for the automorphisms used for encryption and it is not only 
a brute force search through the set Aut . 
A more detailed cryptographical analysis can be found in [5] and there are also three 
modifications given, which are summarized as follows:   
1) We present a modification where the ciphertext is only one reduced word in X 
instead of a sequence of words, in this case it is possible that additional information is 
needed for decryption, thus these are sent with the ciphertext if required. The 
ciphertext can be interpreted as words in X and as words in U, thus the additional 
information could be given about the ciphertext written as a word in U or as a word in X. 
Security: The security certification is extended to the fact that Eve is in general not 
able to identify the beginning and end of a ciphertext unit ic , 1, 2, ,i z=  . There 
could also be cancellations, which she is not able to recognize. Eve is neither able to 
determine the number 1L  because she does not know what the ciphertext units ic  
exactly look like, nor is she able to generate the set NredC . This worsens her attacks of 
the unmodified cryptographic protocol above.  
2) We present a modification, which uses a faithful representation from F into the 
special linear group ( )SL 2,  such that the ciphertext is a sequence of matrices in 
( )SL 2, . Furthermore, a variation can be used, where the ciphertext is not a sequence 
of matrices but a sequence of entries of matrices. This reduces the space for the 
ciphertext and the memory space for the decryption table. 
Security: The security certification is extended to the fact, that there is no algorithm 
known to solve the (constructive) membership problem for (discrete) free subgroups of 
( )SL 2,  which are of rank greater than or equal to 2 and not subgroups of ( )SL 2, , 
see [15]. Therefore, the attack which uses a Cayley graph and automorphisms of Aut  
in the unmodified cryptographic protocol is not realizable in this modification.  
3) We present a modification, which utilizes the negative solution of Hilbert's Tenth 
Problem. Instead of a presentation of the ciphertext as a sequence of matrices in 
( )SL 2,  the ciphertext is represented as a sequence of matrices in ( )GL 2, R  with 
[ ]1 2 : , , , nR y y y=  , the integral polynomial ring in 2n ≥  variables. Here we get two 
subcases, the first applies the modification with Hilbert's Tenth Problem on a text given 
as a sequence of words in X and the second applies it to a text given as a sequence of 
words in U. 
Security: The security certification is extended to Hilbert’s Tenth Problem. In 
addition the security is improved by the fact, that for each encryption Alice and Bob 
can take privately ephemeral matrices in ( )2,GL R , [ ]1 2, , , nR y y y=  , with the 
property that the common private point nD∈  generates the correct matrices in 
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( )PSL 2, . This gives randomness to ciphertexts, which complicates attacks for Eve. 
The attack which uses a Cayley graph and automorphisms of Aut  in the unmodified 
cryptographic protocol is not realizable in this modification.  
Remark 26. In [5] are two more private key cryptosystems given, which use finitely 
generated free groups, Nielsen transformations and automorphisms on finitely 
generated free group. The first one uses automorphisms on F instead of a subgroup of F, 
as in the above described private key cryptosystem. It also has three modifications, 
which use the ideas for the modifications above. The second protocol uses automo- 
rphisms on plaintext units and in addition randomly chosen ephemeral keys (matrices 
of ( )2, ), which give randomness to the ciphertexts.  
7. Cryptosystem with Nielsen Transformation Inspired by the 
ElGamal Cryptosystem 
Now we describe a public key cryptosystem for Alice and Bob which is inspired by the 
ElGamal cryptosystem (see [16] or ([2], Section 1.3)), based on discrete logarithms, that is:  
1) Alice and Bob agree on a finite cyclic group G and a generating element g G∈ .  
2) Alice picks a random natural number a and publishes the element : ac g= .  
3) Bob, who wants to send a message m G∈  to Alice, picks a random natural 
number b and sends the two elements bm c⋅  and bg , to Alice. Note that b abc g= .  
4) Alice recovers ( ) ( )( ) 1ab bm m c g −= ⋅ ⋅ .  
For the new public key cryptosystem in this section let { }1 2, , , NX x x x=  , 3N ≥ , 
be the free generating set of the finitely generated free group F X= . It is 
1 1X X X± −= ∪ . The message is an element *m S∈ , *S  denotes the set of all freely 
reduced words with letters in 1X ± . Public are the free group F, its free generating set X 
and an element *a S∈ . The automorphism f, given as a Nielsen transformation or a 
Whitehead-Automorphism (see for instance the book [17]), should be chosen 
randomly, an approach is given in ([5], Section 4.4). 
An ElGamal like public key cryptosystem, with public parameters determined by 
Alice, is now as follows: 
Public parameters: The finitely generated free group F X= , a freely reduced 
word 1a ≠  in the free group F and an automorphism :f F F→  of infinite order. 
Encryption and Decryption Procedure:   
1) Alice chooses privately a natural number n and publishes the element 
( ) *:nf a c S= ∈ . 
2) Bob picks privately a random t∈  and his message *m S∈ . The number t is an 
ephemeral key for this message, he changes t for each message m, because of Remark 27. 
He calculates the freely reduced elements  
( ) ( )* *1 2: and : .t tm f c c S f a c S⋅ = ∈ = ∈                      (27) 
He sends the ciphertext ( ) * *1 2,c c S S∈ ×  to Alice. 
3) Alice calculates  
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( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 2 2
1
1
,
n t n
t n n t
t n n t
c f c m f c f c
m f f a f f a
m f a f a
m
− −
−
−+ +
⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ ⋅
=
                (28) 
and gets the message m.  
The ElGamal like public key cryptosystem is summarized in Table 12 (page 90). 
Remark 27. It is important that different random ephemeral keys t are used to 
encrypt different messages. As it is for the standard ElGamal cryptosystem (see [18]). 
Suppose that Bob uses the same ephemeral key t to encrypt two messages 1m  and 2m  
and assume that 1m  is known. The ciphertext pairs are ( )1 2,c c  and ( )1 2,c c′ ′ , with 
2 2c c′= , ( )1 1 tc m f c= ⋅  and ( )1 2 tc m f c′ = ⋅ . Eve only has to calculate ( )
1
1 1 1c c m
−′ ⋅ ⋅  
to get the message 2m . 
Security 28. A possible attacker, Eve, can see the elements *1 2, ,c c c S∈ . She does 
not know the free length of m and the cancellations between m and ( )tf c  in 1c . It 
could be possible that m is completely canceled by the first letters of ( )tf c . Hence, 
she cannot determine m from the given 1c . Eve just sees words, ( )tf a  and ( )nf a ,  
 
Table 12. Summary of the ElGamal like public key cryptosystem using automorphisms on a 
finitely generated free group F. 
Public Parameters 
Free group F X= , a freely reduced word 1a ≠  in F 
and an automorphism :f F F→  of infinite order. 
Alice Bob 
Key Creation 
Choose private key n∈ . 
Compute 
( ) *: .nf a c S= ∈  
( *S  denotes the set of all freely reduced words with 
letters in 1X ± .) 
Publish c. 
 
Encryption 
 
Choose plaintext *m S∈ . 
Choose random ephemeral key t ∈ . 
Compute 
( ) ( )* *1 2: and : .t tm f c c S f a c S⋅ = ∈ = ∈  
Send ciphertext ( ) * *1 2,c c S S∈ × to Alice. 
( )1 2,c c←  
Decryption 
Compute 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 2 2
1
1
,
n t n
t n n t
t n n t
c f c m f c f c
m f f a f f a
m f a f a
m
− −
−
−+ +
⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ ⋅
=
 
which is the message from Bob. 
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in the free generating set X from which it is unlikely to realize the exponents n and t, 
that is, the private keys from Alice and Bob, respectively. The security is based on the 
Diffie-Hellman problem and discrete logarithm problem in cyclic subgroups of 
automorphisms in free groups.  
Variation 29. We give some ideas to enhance the security, they can also be 
combined:   
1) The element *a S∈  could be taken as a common private secret between Alice 
and Bob. They could use for example the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key exchange 
protocol (see for instance [2]) to agree on the element a.  
2) Alice and Bob agree on a faithful representation from F into the special linear group 
of all 2 2×  matrices with entries in  , that is, ( ): SL 2,g F →  . Now, *m S∈  and 
Bob sends the element ( ) ( )( ) ( )1: SL 2,tg m g f c c⋅ = ∈   instead of 
( ) *1:tm f c c S⋅ = ∈ ; c and 2c  remain the same. Therefore, Alice calculates 
( )( )( ) ( )11 2nc g f c g m−⋅ =  and hence the message ( )( )1 *m g g m S−= ∈ . This variation 
in addition extends the security certification to the constructive membership problem 
in the matrix group ( )SL 2,  (see [15]). 
We now explain this variation in more details. 
In addition to { }1 2, , , NX x x x=   Alice chooses a second abstract set 
{ }1 2, , , NY y y y=  , with X Y∩ =∅ , which generates a free group F Y′ =  of 
rank N. The automorphism f from Alice is an automorphism on a free group of rank 
X  if we identify ix  with iy  for 1, 2, ,i N=  , then f is also an automorphism of 
F ′ , because X Y=  and hence F ′  is isomorphic to F, see Theorem 12. 
Alice needs a faithful representation of X Y∪  into ( )SL 2,  such that  
( ): SL 2,g X Y∪ →   
( )with 1, 2, , and SL 2,i i ix M i N M= ∈               (29) 
( ) ( )with 1, 2, , and SL 2, and SL 2,i i i iy W i N W W= ∈ ∉         (30) 
Thus, each iW  has at least one entry which is an element in \  .   
(a) The public element from Alice is as before ( ) *nc f a S= ∈ , with private key 
n∈ .  
(b) Bob chooses privately a message *m S∈ , a random t∈  and calculates 
( ) *2 tc f a S= ∈  as before. After this he computes ( ) ( )( ) ( ) *t t n t nf c f f a f a S+= = ∈  
and writes it as a word in Y whereby he used the assignment i ix y=  for 1 i N≤ ≤ . 
We denote ( )tf c  as ( )tYf c  when ( )tf c  is written as a word in Y. The element 
( )tYf c  is a reduced word in Y. Bob’s element ( )1 tYc m f c= ⋅  is now a reduced word in 
X Y∪ . He applies the faithful representation g on this element. It is  
( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )
( )1
SL 2, SL 2,
: SL 2, .t tY Yg m f c g m g f c c
∈ ∈
′⋅ = ⋅ = ∈


 
           (31) 
Instead of ( ) * *2 1,c c S S∈ ×  he sends ( ) ( )*2 1, SL 2,c c S′ ∈ ×   to Alice.  
(c) Firstly, Alice calculates ( )2nf c  and hence gets the same element ( )tf c  as  
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Bob, because  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 .n n t n t t n t n tf c f f a f a f a f f a f c+ += = = = =        (32) 
Secondly, she writes ( )2nf c  as a word in Y, thus she gets ( )tYf c . Thirdly, she uses 
the faithful representation g to calculate ( )( )tYg f c  and together with 1c′  she gets  
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )1 11 SL 2, .t t tY Y Yc g f c g m g f c g f c g m− −′ ⋅ = ⋅ = ∈       (33) 
She gets a matrix in ( )SL 2,  and she knows that this matrix is a word in the letters 
of iM , 1 i N≤ ≤ , hence there is an algorithm (see for instance [8]) to write ( )g m  as 
a word in ( )g X  and therefore as a word in X. Thus, she is able to recon-struct m.  
An eavesdropper, Eve, gets a matrix ( )1 SL 2,c′ ∈   and she is not able to write it as 
a word in the set X Y∪  (because there is no algorithm known to solve the 
constructive membership problem in a (discrete) free subgroup of ( )SL 2,  of rank 
greater than or equal to 2 (see [15]), which is not in ( )SL 2, ). Thus, she cannot get 
the situation as in the cryptosystem without the faithful representation g into 
( )SL 2, . There is no hint for the message m, instead of the system above in which it 
is possible that an initial segment of m is visible whereby Eve does not know how long 
this initial segment is and if it is relay visible. Thus, this variation extends the security 
certification to the constructive membership problem in the matrix group ( )SL 2, .  
We now end this section with an example. 
Example 30. This example, is a very small one and it is just given for illustration 
purposes. The calculations were done with GAP, see Appendix B. Bob wants to send a 
message to Alice.  
The public parameters are the free group F of rank 3 with free generating set 
{ }, ,X x y z= , the freely reduced word a F∈ , with 2 2:a x yz y−=  and the automor- 
phism :f F F→ , which is given, for this example, by the regular Nielsen transform- 
ation: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1.2 3.2 3 2.32 2 1 2N N N N   , thus, it is:  
:f F F→  
2 ,x xy  
1,y z−  
1 1.z y z− −  
1) Alice’s private key is 7n = . Thus, she gets the automorphism  
7 :f F F→  
( ) ( )222 1 2x xy z y yz zyz y zy−  
( )( )221 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2y y z y z y z z y z− − − − − − − − −  
( )( ) ( )
222 21 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1.z y z z y z y z y z z− − − − − − − − − −  
 

 
Her public key is  
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 22 22 27 2 1 2 2 2 1: .c f a xy z y yz zyz y zy z y zyz yz zyz yz− −= =  
2) Bob privately picks the ephemeral key 5t =  and gets the automorphism  
5 :f F F→  
( )22 1 2x xy z y z zy−  
( )21 1 1 1 1y y z y z z− − − − −  
( )( )221 1 1 1 2.z y z z y z− − − − −  
His message for Alice is 2 2 2 1 1m z y zx y x− − −= . He calculates  
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
5
1
22 2 22 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
2222 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
22 21 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
221 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
c m f c
z y zx yz z y z y z y z y z z y
z y z y z z y z y z z y z y z y z
z y z y z y z y z z xy z y
z z y z y z y z y z
− − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − −
= ⋅
=
  
     
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
3
2 21 1 1 1 1
322 21 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
22 21 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
z y z y z
y z z y z y z y z y z y z
z y z y z y z y z y z y
− − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − −
  
    



 
and  
( ) ( )( ) ( )22 25 2 1 2 2 12 : .c f a xy z y z zy z y zyz zyz− −= =  
The ciphertext for Alice is the tuple ( )1 2,c c .  
3) Alice first computes  
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
2222 21 2 2 27 1
2
222 22 2
2222 2 22 2 2 2 2
222 2 22 2 1 1 1
f c y zy z zyz zy zyz zy zyz yz zyz
zy zyz yz zyzyz zyz y z
y z y zy z yzy z zyz y zy z zyz y z y
zyz yz zyzyz zyz y z zy y x
− −
− − −
    =        
  
     
       
 
    
 
and gets m by  
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( )( ) 17 2 2 2 1 11 2 .m c f c z y zx y x
− − − −= ⋅ =  
8. Conclusions  
A. Shamir’s secret sharing protocol (see [6]) has become the standard method for 
solving the ( ),n t -secret sharing problem. The introduced secret sharing schemes are of 
mathematical interest. 
In contrast to other secret sharing schemes the part for the participants at the 
combinatorial secret sharing scheme, see Section 3, is very easy, they only have to add 
up m elements. The (time) expensive part is the part of the dealer, who has to generate 
the sets iR  for the participants. In contrast to Shamir's scheme, where the part of the 
dealer is the easier one and the participants have to do polynomial interpolation to 
reconstruct the secret. 
The secret sharing scheme of Section 4 uses combinatorial group theory, especially 
Nielsen transformations and finitely generated free groups. It is mathematically a very 
interesting cryptographic protocol, which serves very good as a basis to develop other 
cryptographic protocol. In addition the secret sharing scheme of Section 5 is also a 
mathematically very interesting cryptographic protocol. Both secret sharing schemes 
are the basis for the newly developed cryptosystems. 
In comparison to the standard cryptosystems which are mostly based on number 
theory we explained two cryptosystems which use combinatorial group theory. The first 
cryptosystem in Section 6 is a kind of a one-time pad, which choice of the random 
sequence for encryption is not number-theoretic. Especially the modifications with 
matrices are of interest for cryptography. If the symmetric key cryptosystem is used 
together with the second modification, which uses a faithful representation into 
( )SL 2, , then the system is secure and the security depends on the unknown solution 
of the (constructive) membership problem in the used matrix groups. If it is used 
together with the third modification, which uses matrices in ( )GL 2, R , 
[ ]1 2, , , nR y y y=  , 2n ≥ , then the system is secure and the security depends in 
addition on the negative solution of Hilbert’s Tenth Problem. Moreover, we get also 
randomness to each ciphertext by the ephemeral matrices which the encrypter used for 
encryption. To generate these ephemeral matrices he only needs the common secret 
point nD∈ , this improves also the security. Altogether, we get interesting new 
private key cryptosystems, which use non-commutative groups and are based on 
combinatorial group theory and not only on number theory. They provide other 
options for private key cryptosystems which are based on combinatorial group theory. 
The second cryptosystem in Section 7 is similar to the ElGamal cryptosystem (see [16]), 
which is easier to handle. The ElGamal cryptosystem is based on the discrete logarithm 
problem over a finite field. If this problem should eventually be solved we introduced 
here an alternative system, which is not based on number theory. 
For further research one could search for other cryptographic protocols, which can 
be based on Nielsen transformations, for example a public key cryptosystem which is 
not ElGamal like or a key exchange protocol. There is no algorithm known to solve the 
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(constructive) membership problem for (discrete) free subgroups of rank equal or 
greater than 2 in ( )SL 2, . Thus, the following questions appear: Are there quantum 
algorithms for solving the (constructive) membership problem in ( )SL 2, ? Are there 
quantum algorithms for solving other problems in combinatorial group theory, which 
are used in cryptography? 
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Appendix 
We now give the computer code in GAP2 for Example 24 and Example 30. Therefore 
we use the FGA3 package in GAP and also Nielsen transformations. 
If there are Nielsen transformations of type ( )1N  one after another we can do them 
in one step. For example if the Nielsen transformations ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )5 3 2 3.21 1 1 2N N N N  are 
applied to a set ( ), , , ,a b c d e  we write instead of  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
5
3
2
3.2
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1
, , , , , , , ,
, , , ,
, , , ,
, , , ,
N
N
N
N
a b c d e a b c d e
a b c d e
a b c d e
a b cb d e
−
− −
− − −
− − − −
→
→
→
→
 
the following 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
5 3 2
3.2
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1
, , , , , , , ,
, , , , .
N N N
N
a b c d e a b c d e
a b cb d e
− − −
− − − −
→
→
 
A. Calculations in GAP for Example 24 
Alice and Bob use the free group F X= , with free generating set { }, ,X x y z= , 
and the explicit free subgroup UF  of F with free generating set { }1 2 8, , ,U u u u=  , 
iu  words in X, they choose  
1 1 1 1 2
1 2 3 4: , : , : , : ,u xyz u yzy u x zx u y x
− − − −= = = =  
1 1 1 3 3 2
5 6 7 8: , : , : , : .u z xyx u z yx u x y u y z
− − − −= = = =  
In GAP they define  
LoadPackage("FGA");;  
F:=FreeGroup("x", "y", "z");;  
AssignGeneratorVariables(F);;  
u1:=x*y*z;;  
u2:=y*z*y^-1;;  
u3:=x^-1*z*x^-1;;  
u4:=y^-1*x^2;;  
u5:=z^-1*x*y*x;;  
u6:=z^-1*y*x^-1;;  
u7:=x^3*y;;  
u8:=y^3*z^-2;;  
FU:=Group(u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8);; 
and prove that U is a Nielsen reduced set with the operation 
 FreeGeneratorsOfGroup(FU) 
 
 
2Groups, Algorithms and Programming [14]. 
3Free Group Algorithms. A GAP4 Package by Christian Sievers, TU Braunschweig. 
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which gives a Nielsen reduced generator set for the group FU: 
gap> Free Generators Of Group (FU); 
[x*y*z, y*z*y^-1, x^-1*z*x^-1, y^-1*x^2, z^-1*x*y*x,\ 
z^-1*y*x^-1, x^3*y, y^3*z^-2 ] 
Alice knows the linear congruence generator h hence she can get the 4 required 
automorphisms of the set Aut  to encrypt her message. 
These automorphisms are describable with Nielsen transformations as follows: 
 Automorphism 
1u
f :  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1.7
2.4
5
7.8
2
3.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2
1 7 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2
1 7 2 4 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1
1 7 2 4 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 1
1 7 2 4 3 4 5 6 7 8 8
2
1 7 2 4 3 4
( , , , , , , , )
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, ,
N
N
N
N
N
u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u
−
−
  
→
→
→
→
→( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
4.6
5.1
7
6.3
2 1
4 5 6 7 8 8
2 2 1
1 7 2 4 3 4 4 6 5 6 7 8 8
2 2 1
1 7 2 4 3 4 4 6 5 1 7 6 7 8 8
1 2 1 1 1
1 7 2 4 3 4 4 6 5 1 7 6 8 7 8
2 2 1
1 7 2 4 3 4 4 6 5
, , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , ,
N
N
N
N
u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u
−
−
−
− − −
−
→
→
→
→( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
8.1
7.4
7
2 1 1
1 7 6 3 4 8 7 8
2 2 1 2 1 1
1 7 2 4 3 4 4 6 5 1 7 6 3 4 8 7 8 1 7
2 2 1 2 1 1
1 7 2 4 3 4 4 6 5 1 7 6 3 4 8 7 4 6 8 1 7
1 2 1 2 1
1 7 2 4 3 4 4 6 5 1 7 6 3 4 6
, , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
N
N
N
u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
− −
− − −
− − −
− −
→
→
→( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1.2
2.3
4.5
1
4 7 8 8 1 7
2 2 1 2 1 1
1 7 2 4 2 4 3 4 4 6 5 1 7 6 3 4 6 4 7 8 8 1 7
2 2 2 1 2 1 1
1 7 2 4 2 4 3 4 3 4 4 6 5 1 7 6 3 4 6 4 7 8 8 1 7
2 2 2
1 7 2 4 2 4 3 4 3 4 4 6 5
,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , ,
N
N
N
u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u
−
− − −
− − −
→
→
→( )1 1 2 1 11 7 5 1 7 6 3 4 6 4 7 8 8 1 7, , , ,u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u− − − −
 
Hence, the automorphism is  
1u
:f H H→  
1 1 7 2 4 ,u u u u u  
2
2 2 4 3 4 ,u u u u u  
2
3 3 4 ,u u u  
1
4 4 6 5 1 7 ,u u u u u u
−
  
1
5 5 1 7 ,u u u u
−
  
2
6 6 3 4 ,u u u u  
1 1
7 6 4 7 8 ,u u u u u
− −
  
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8 8 1 7.u u u u  
 Automorphism 2uf :  
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1.3
3.5
2 4
6.5
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2
1 3 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2
1 3 2 3 5 4 5 6 7 8
1 1 1 1
1 3 2 3 5 4 5 6 7 8
2 1 1
1 3 2 3 5 4 5 6 5 7 8
1 1 1 1
3 1 2 3
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, ,
N
N
N N
N
N
u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u
− −
− −
− − −
→
→
→
→
→( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
3.4
5.2
7.6
4.2
1
5 4 5 6 5 7 8
2 1 1 1 2 1
3 1 2 3 5 4 4 5 6 5 7 8
2 1 1 1 2 1 1
3 1 2 3 5 4 4 5 2 6 5 7 8
2 1 1 1 2 1 1
3 1 2 3 5 4 4 5 2 6 5 7 6 5 8
2
3
, , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
N
N
N
N
u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u
−
  − − − − − 
− − − − − −
− − − − − −
→
→
→
→( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
2.8
8.4
4
1 1 1 2 1 1 1
1 2 3 5 4 4 2 5 2 6 5 7 6 5 8
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
3 1 2 8 3 5 4 4 2 5 2 6 5 7 6 5 8
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 2 8 3 5 4 4 2 5 2 6 5 7 6 5 8 4 2
1 1
3 1
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
N
N
N
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u
− − − − − − −
− − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − −
−
→
→
→( )
( ) ( )
( )
1.4
2.6
1 1 2 1 1 1
2 8 3 5 4 2 4 5 2 6 5 7 6 5 8 4 2
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
3 1 2 4 2 8 3 5 4 2 4 5 2 6 5 7 6 5 8 4 2
2 1 1 1 2 1 1
3 1 2 4 2 8 6 5 3 5 4 2 4 5 2 6 5 7 6 5 8 4 2
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
N
N
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
− − − − − −
− − − − − − −
− − − − − − −
→
→( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
5.6
6.4
4.7
1
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
3 1 2 4 2 8 6 5 3 5 4 2 4 5 2 6 5 6 5 7 6 5 8 4 2
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
3 1 2 4 2 8 6 5 3 5 4 2 4 5 2 6 5 6 5 2 4 7 6 5 8 4 2
2 1 1 1
3 1 2 4 2 8 6 5 3
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, ,
N
N
N
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u
− − − − − − −
− − − − − − −
− − −
→
→
→( )2 1 1 15 4 2 4 7 6 5 5 2 6 5 6 5 2 4 7 6 5 8 4 2, , , , ,u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u− − − −
 
Hence, the automorphism is  
2u
:f H H→  
1 1
1 3 1 2 4 ,u u u u u
− −
  
1
2 2 8 6 5 ,u u u u u
−
  
2
3 3 5 4 ,u u u u
−
  
4 2 4 7 6 5 ,u u u u u u  
1
5 5 2 6 5 ,u u u u u
−
  
6 6 5 2 4 ,u u u u u  
7 7 6 5 ,u u u u  
1 1
8 8 4 2 .u u u u
− −
  
 Automorphism 
3u
f :  
B. Fine et al. 
 
100 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
2 5 8
6.3
3.7
1.2
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 3 7 8
2 1 1 1
1 2 3 7 4 5 6 3 7 8
2 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 3 7 4 5 6 3 7 8
2
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
N N N
N
N
N
N
u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − − −
→
→
→
→
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
.8
5.6
8.3
6.3
1 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 3 7 4 8 5 6 3 7 8
2 1 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 3 7 4 8 5 6 3 6 3 7 8
2 1 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 3 7 4 8 5 6 3 6 3 7 8 3 7
2 1 1 2
1 2 2 3 7 4 8 5
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , ,
N
N
N
u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u
  − − − − − 
− − − − −
− − − − −
− − −
→
→
→
→( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
8
2.3
7.4
1 2 1
6 3 6 3 7 7 8 3 7
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 3 7 4 8 5 6 3 6 3 7 7 7 3 8
2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 3 7 3 7 4 8 5 6 3 6 3 7 7 7 3 8
2 1 1 2 1
1 2 2 3 7 3 7 4 8 5 6 3
, , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , ,
N
N
N
u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u
− −
− − − − − −
− − − − − −
− − − −
→
→
→( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1.8
3.4
2 2 1 1
6 3 7 7 4 8 7 3 8
2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1
1 2 7 3 8 2 3 7 3 7 4 8 5 6 3 6 3 7 7 4 8 7 3 8
2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1
1 2 7 3 8 2 3 7 3 7 4 8 4 8 5 6 3 6 3 7 7 4 8 7 3 8
, ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
N
N
u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
− − −
− − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − −
→
→
 
Hence, the automorphism is  
3u
:f H H→  
1 1 1
1 1 2 7 3 8 ,u u u u u u
− − −
  
1
2 2 3 7 ,u u u u
−
  
2
3 3 7 4 8 ,u u u u u
−
  
2
4 4 8 ,u u u
−
  
1
5 5 6 3 ,u u u u
−
  
2
6 6 3 7 ,u u u u  
2
7 7 4 8 ,u u u u
−
  
1 1
8 7 3 8.u u u u
− −
  
 Automorphism 
4u
f : 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 3 4
6.2
3
8.2
2.3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 2 7 8
2 1 1 1 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 2 7 8 2
2 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 3 4 5 6 2 7
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
N N N
N
N
N
u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u
− − −
− − −
  − − − 
− − − −
→
→
→
→( )
( ) ( )3.4
3
8 2
2 1 1 1 1 1 3
1 2 3 3 4 4 5 6 2 7 8 2, , , , , , ,
N
u
u u u u u u u u u u u u− − − − −→
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
5.2
7.4
1.3
4.5
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
1 2 3 3 4 4 5 2 3 6 2 7 8 2
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
1 2 3 3 4 4 5 2 3 6 2 7 4 8 2
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
1 3 4 2 3 3 4 4 5 2 3 6 2 7 4 8 2
2
1
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
N
N
N
N
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u
− − − − − −
− − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − −
−
→
→
→
→( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
8.3
1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
3 4 2 3 3 4 4 5 2 3 5 2 3 6 2 7 4 8 2
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1
1 3 4 2 3 3 4 4 5 2 3 5 2 3 6 2 7 4 8 2 3 4
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 3 1 3 2 3 4 4 5 2 3 5
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , ,
N
N N
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u
− − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − −
→
→( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
7.2
3
2.3
1 1 3 1 1
2 3 6 2 7 4 8 2 3 4
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1
4 3 1 3 2 3 4 4 5 2 3 5 2 3 6 2 7 4 3 2 8 2 3 4
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1
4 3 1 3 2 4 3 4 5 2 3 5 2 3 6 2 7 4 3 2 8 2 3 4
2
, , ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
N
N
N
u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
− − − −
− − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − −
→
→
( )
( ) ( )
( )
3.5
6.1
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1
4 3 1 3 2 4 3 4 3 4 5 2 3 5 2 3 6 2 7 4 3 2 8 2 3 4
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1
4 3 1 3 2 4 3 4 3 5 2 3 4 5 2 3 5 2 3 6 2 7 4 3 2 8 2 3 4
2 1
4 3 1 3 2 4 3
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
, ,
N
N
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u u u u u u u
− − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − −
−
→
→
→( )1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 14 3 5 2 3 4 5 2 3 5 2 3 6 2 4 3 1 7 4 3 2 8 2 3 4, , , , ,u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u− − − − − − − −
 
Hence, the automorphism is  
4u
:f H H→  
1 4 3 1,u u u u  
1
2 3 2 4 3 ,u u u u u
−
  
1
3 4 3 5 2 3 ,u u u u u u
−
  
1 1
4 4 5 2 3 ,u u u u u
− −
  
1
5 5 2 3 ,u u u u
−
  
6 6 2 4 3 1,u u u u u u  
1 1
7 7 4 3 2 ,u u u u u
− −
  
3 1 1
8 8 2 3 4 .u u u u u
− −
  
In GAP she defines for the automorphisms: 
#Automorphism f_{u_1}  
u11:=u1*u7*u2*u4;;  
u12:=u2*u4*u3*u4^2;;  
u13:=u3*u4^2;;  
u14:=u4*u6*u5^-1*u1*u7;;  
u15:=u5^-1*u1*u7;;  
u16:=u6*u3*u4^2;;  
u17:=u6^-1*u4^-1*u7*u8;;  
u18:=u8*u1*u7;;  
#Automorphism f_{u_2}  
u21:=u3^-1*u1^-1*u2*u4;;  
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u22:=u2^-1*u8*u6*u5;;  
u23:=u3*u5*u4^-2;;  
u24:=u2*u4*u7*u6*u5;;  
u25:=u5*u2^-1*u6*u5;;  
u26:=u6*u5*u2*u4;;  
u27:=u7*u6*u5;;  
u28:=u8*u4^-1*u2^-1;;  
#Automorphism f_{u_3}  
u31:=u1*u2^-1*u7^-1*u3^-1*u8;;  
u32:=u2^-1*u3*u7;;  
u33:=u3*u7*u4*u8^-2;;  
u34:=u4*u8^-2;;  
u35:=u5^-1*u6*u3;;  
u36:=u6*u2^3*u7;;  
u37:=u7*u4*u8^-2;;  
u38:=u7^-1*u3^-1*u8;;  
#Automorphism f_{u_4}  
u41:=u4*u3*u1;;  
u42:=u3*u2^-1*u4*u3;;  
u43:=u4*u3*u5*u2*u3^-1;;  
u44:=u4^-1*u5*u2*u3^-1;;  
u45:=u5*u2*u3^-1;;  
u46:=u6*u2*u4*u3*u1;;  
u47:=u7*u4^-1*u3*u2^-1;;  
u48:=u8*u2^3*u3^-1*u4^-1;; 
 
Hence, to get the ciphertext  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
u u u u
u 1 u 4 u 7 u 2
C f f f f
f u f u f u f u
=
=
L O V E
 
as a word in X, she calculates in GAP: 
gap > u11;  
x*y*z*x^3*y^2*z*y^-2*x^2  
gap> u24;  
y*z*y^-2*x^5*y*z^-1*y*x^-1*z^-1*x*y*x  
gap> u37;  
x^5*(z^2*y^-3)^2  
gap> u42;  
x^-1*z*x^-1*y*z^-1*y^-2*x*z*x^-1 
Thus, the ciphertext is  
( )23 2 2 2 2 5 1 1 1 5 2 3 1 1 1 2 1C xyzx y zy x yzy x yz yx z xyx x z y x zx yz y xzx− − − − − − − − − − −=     
and this is sent to Bob. 
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For decryption Bob calculates the tables Table 10 (page 86) and Table 11 (page 87). 
For this he chooses the automorphisms in aut , which Alice also used. In GAP it is: 
gap> u11; u12; u13; u14; u15; u16; u17; u18;  
x*y*z*x^3*y^2*z*y^-2*x^2  
y*z*y^-2*x*z*x^-1*(y^-1*x^2)^2  
x^-1*z*x^-1*(y^-1*x^2)^2  
y^-1*x^2*z^-1*y*x^-2*y^-1*x^-1*z*x*y*z*x^3*y  
x^-1*y^-1*x^-1*z*x*y*z*x^3*y  
z^-1*y*x^-2*z*x^-1*(y^-1*x^2)^2  
x*y^-1*z*x^-2*y*x^3*y^4*z^-2 y^3*z^-2*x*y*z*x^3*y 
gap> u21; u22; u23; u24; u25; u26; u27; u28;  
(x*z^-1)^2*y^-1*x^-1*y*z*y^-2*x^2  
y*z^-1*y^2*z^-3*y*x^-1*z^-1*x*y*x  
x^-1*z*x^-1*z^-1*x*(y*x^-1)^2*x^-1*y  
y*z*y^-2*x^5*y*z^-1*y*x^-1*z^-1*x*y*x 
z^-1*(x*y)^2*z^-1*y^-1*z^-1*y*x^-1*z^-1*x*y*x 
z^-1*y*x^-1*z^-1*(x*y)^2*z*y^-2*x^2  
x^3*y*z^-1*y*x^-1*z^-1*x*y*x  
y^3*z^-2*x^-2*y^2*z^-1*y^-1  
gap> u31; u32; u33; u34; u35; u36; u37; u38; 
x*y*z*y*z^-1*y^-2*x^-2*z^-1*x*y^3*z^-2  
y*z^-1*y^-1*x^-1*z*x^2*y  
x^-1*z*x^4*(z^2*y^-3)^2  
y^-1*x^2*(z^2*y^-3)^2  
x^-1*y^-1*x^-1*y*x^-2*z*x^-1  
z^-1*y*x^-1*y*z^3*y^-1*x^3*y  
x^5*(z^2*y^-3)^2  
y^-1*x^-2*z^-1*x*y^3*z^-2  
gap> u41; u42; u43; u44; u45; u46; u47; u48;  
y^-1*x*z*y*z  
x^-1*z*x^-1*y*z^-1*y^-2*x*z*x^-1  
y^-1*x*z*x^-1*z^-1*(x*y)^2*z*y^-1*x*z^-1*x 
x^-2*y*z^-1*(x*y)^2*z*y^-1*x*z^-1*x  
z^-1*(x*y)^2*z*y^-1*x*z^-1*x  
z^-1*y*x^-1*y*z*y^-2*x*z*y*z  
x^3*y*x^-2*y*x^-1*z*x^-1*y*z^-1*y^-1  
y^3*z^-2*y*z^3*y^-1*x*z^-1*x^-1*y 
 
With this information Bob is able to reconstruct the message S = LOVE . 
B. Calculations in GAP for Example 30  
Alice defines the public parameters. 
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Let { }, ,X x y z=  be the free generating set for a free subgroup of rank 3: 
LoadPackage("FGA");;  
F:=FreeGroup("x", "y", "z");;  
AssignGeneratorVariables(F);; 
 
Additionally she defines the freely reduced word 2 1:a x yz y−=  and describes the 
automorphisms f with the following regular Nielsen transformation 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
1.2
3.2
3
2.3
2 2
2 2
2 1 1
2 2 1 1 1
, , , ,
, ,
, ,
, , ;
N
N
N
N
x y z xy y z
xy y zy
xy y y z
xy z y z
  
− −
− − −
→
→
→
→
 
hence the automorphism is  
:f F F→  
2 ,x xy  
1,y z−  
1 1,z y z− −  
and she defines in GAP:  
x1:=x*y^2;;  
y1:=z^(-1);;  
z1:=y^(-1)*z^(-1);; 
Alice chooses as private key 7n = , hence she must calculate the automorphism 7f . 
For this she calculates in GAP: 
#Calculate automorphism f^2=f^1(f^1)  
x2:=x1*y1^2;;  
y2:=z1^(-1);;  
z2:=y1^(-1)*z1^(-1);;  
gap> x2; y2; z2;  
x*y^2*z^-2  
z*y  
z^2*y  
#Calculate automorphism f^3=f^1(f^2)  
x3:=x2*y2^2;;  
y3:=z2^(-1);;  
z3:=y2^(-1)*z2^(-1);;  
gap> x3; y3; z3;  
x*y^2*z^-1*y*z*y  
y^-1*z^-2  
B. Fine et al. 
 
105 
(y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1  
#Calculate automorphism f^5=f^2(f^3)  
x5:=x3*y3^2*z3^(-2);;  
y5:=z3*y3;;  
z5:=z3^2*y3;;  
gap> x5; y5; z5;  
x*y^2*z^-1*y^2*z*(z*y)^2  
y^-1*(z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1  
((y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1)^2*y^-1*z^-2  
#Calculate automorphism f^7=f^2(f^5)  
x7:=x5*y5^(2)*z5^(-2);;  
y7:=z5*y5;;  
z7:=z5^2*y5;;  
gap> x7; y7; z7;  
x*y^2*z^-1*y*(y*z)^2*(z*y*z^2*y)^2*z*y 
y^-1*((z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-1*z^-2 
(((y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1)^2*y^-1*z^-2)^2*y^-1*(z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1 
 
Thus, the automorphism 7f  is  
7 :f F F  
( ) ( )222 1 2 ,x xy z y yz zyz y zy−  
( )( )221 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 ,y y z y z y z z y z− − − − − − − − −  
( )( ) ( )
222 21 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1.z y z z y z y z y z z− − − − − − − − − −  
 

 
Her public key is ( )7:c f a= : 
c:=x7^2*y7*z7^(-2)*y7;;  
gap> c;  
(x*y^2*z^-1*y*(y*z)^2*(z*y*z^2*y)^2*z*y)^2*(z^2*y)^2*\ 
((z*y*z)^2*y*z)^2*z*y*z^2*y*z^-1 
 
Bob is now able to send a message to Alice. Let 2 2 2 1 1m z y zx y x− − −=  be the message 
for Alice. He chooses the ephemeral key 5t =  and hence calculates the automorphism 
5f  in GAP as follows: 
m:=z^-2*y^2*z*x^2*y^-1*x^-1;;  
#Calculate automorphism f^2=f^1(f^1)  
x2:=x1*y1^2;;  
y2:=z1^(-1);;  
z2:=y1^(-1)*z1^(-1);;  
gap> x2; y2; z2; x*y^2*z^-2 z*y z^2*y  
#Calculate automorphism f^3=f^1(f^2)  
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x3:=x2*y2^2;;  
y3:=z2^(-1);;  
z3:=y2^(-1)*z2^(-1);;  
gap> x3; y3; z3;  
x*y^2*z^-1*y*z*y  
y^-1*z^-2  
(y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1  
#Calculate automorphism f^5=f^2(f^3)  
x5:=x3*y3^2*z3^(-2);;  
y5:=z3*y3;;  
z5:=z3^2*y3;;  
gap> x5; y5; z5;  
x*y^2*z^-1*y^2*z*(z*y)^2  
y^-1*(z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1  
((y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1)^2*y^-1*z^-2 
 
Hence, the automorphism 5f  is  
5 :f F F→  
( )22 1 2 ,x xy z y z zy−  
( )21 1 1 1 1,y y z y z z− − − − −  
( )( )221 1 1 1 2.z y z z y z− − − − −  
He now calculates his ciphertext ( )1 2,c c  for Alice with ( )51c m f c= ⋅  and 
( )52c f a=  in GAP: 
#c22:=f^5(c)  
c22:=(x5*y5^2*z5^(-1)*y5*(y5*z5)^2*(z5*y5*z5^2*y5)^2*z5*y5)^2*\ 
(z5^2*y5)^2*((z5*y5*z5)^2*y5*z5)^2*z5*y5*z5^2*y5*z5^(-1);;  
c1:=m*c22;;  
gap> c1;  
z^-2*y^2*z*x^2*(y*z^-1)^2*((z^-1*y^-1*z^-2*y^-1)^2\ 
*z^-2*y^-1)^2*(z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-1*((((z^-\ 
1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-1*z^-1*y^-1*z^\ 
-1)^2*(z^-1*y^-1*z^-2*y^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*((\ 
z^-1*y^-1*z^-2*y^-1)^2*z^-2*y^-1)^2*(z^-1*y^-1*z^-\ 
1)^2*z^-1*x*y^2*z^-1*y*(z^-1*(((z^-1*y^-1*z^-2*y^-\ 
1)^2*z^-2*y^-1)^2*(z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-1)^3*\ 
(z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*y^-1*z^-1*((z^-1*y^-1*z^-2*y^-1\ 
)^2*z^-2*y^-1)^2*(z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*y^-1)^3*z^-1*(\ 
(z^-1*y^-1*z^-2*y^-1)^2*z^-2*y^-1)^2*(z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*\  
y^-1*z^-1*y  
#c2:=f^5(a)  
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c2:=x5^2*y5*z5^(-2)*y5;;  
gap> c2;  
(x*y^2*z^-1*y^2*z*(z*y)^2)^2*z^2*y*(z*y*z)^2*z*y*z^-1 
 
Bob sends ( )1 2,c c  to Alice. Alice gets the message m by calculating  
( )( ) 171 2 .m c f c
−
= ⋅  
In GAP she computes: 
#dc:=f^7(c2)  
dc:=(x7*y7^2*z7^(-1)*y7^2*z7*(z7*y7)^2)^2*z7^2*y7*\ 
(z7*y7*z7)^2*z7*y7*z7^(-1);;  
gap> dc;  
(x*y*(y*z^-1)^2*((z^-1*y^-1*z^-2*y^-1)^2*z^-2*y^-1\  
)^2*(z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-1*((((z^-1*y^-1*z^-\ 
1)^2*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-1*z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*(z^-\ 
1*y^-1*z^-2*y^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*((z^-1*y^-1*\ 
z^-2*y^-1)^2*z^-2*y^-1)^2*(z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1)\ 
^2*y^-1*(((z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-\ 
1*z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*(z^-1*y^-1*z^-2*y^-1)^2*z^-1*y\ 
^-1*z^-1*((((z^-1*y^-1*z^-2*y^-1)^2*z^-2*y^-1)^2*(\ 
z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-1)^2*((z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2\ 
*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-1*z^-2*y^-1)^2*(((z^-1*y^-1*\ 
z^-1)^2*y^-1*z^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-1*z^-1*y^-1*z^-1)^2*(\ 
z^-1*y^-1*z^-2*y^-1)^2*z^-1*y^-1*z^-1*y  
gap> dc^-1;  
y^-1*(((((z*y)^2*z)^2*z*y*z)^2*z*y*(z*y*z)^2)^2*z*\ 
y*((z*y*z)^2*y*z)^2*z*y*z)^2*(z*y*(((z*y*z)^2*y*z)\ 
^2*z*y*z*y*z)^2*(z*y*z^2*y)^2*z)^2*y*(((((z^2*y)^2\ 
*z*y)^2*z^2*y*z*y)^2*z*(z*y*z^2*y)^2*z*y)^2*z*(z*y\ 
*z^2*y)^2*z^2*y*(((z*y*z)^2*y*z)^2*z*y*z*y*z)^2*(z\ 
*y*z^2*y)^2*z*(z*y^-1)^2*y^-1*x^-1)^2  
gap> c1*dc^-1; 
z^-2*y^2*z*x^2*y^-1*x^-1 
 
Finally, she reconstructs the correct message  
2 2 2 1 1.z y zx y x− − −  
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